Tag Archives: jon_rauch

The best Rauch summary

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Jonathan Rauch writes in Yascha Mounk’s Persuasion Community.

If we care about knowledge, freedom, and peace, then we need to stake a strong claim: Anyone can believe anything, but liberal science—open-ended, depersonalized checking by an error-seeking social network—is the only legitimate validator of knowledge, at least in the reality-based community. Other communities, of course, can do all kinds of other things. But they cannot make social decisions about objective reality.

The overall essay is the best summary of Rauch’s Constitution of Knowledge that I have seen. Read it. I like this particular essay better than I like the book.

I am fine with Rauch’s rules for social epistemology. What bothers me about the book is the assumption that he makes implicitly–and often explicitly–that we can look to twentieth-century institutions to revive what he calls the reality-based community. He writes as if Harvard and the NYT are basically ok, and all that we need is for Google, Facebook, and Twitter to do a better job of moderating content on their platforms.

In Rauch, you won’t find anything like what I wrote in academic corruption 1, academic corruption 2, or academic corruption 3.

Rauch is un-FIT

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I write on Jonathan Rauch’s new book here.

I doubt that his exhortations and calls for a return to twentieth-century values in those fields will work.

I think that if we are going to fix the problem with social epistemology, we are going to need new prestige hierarchies to replace the old ones. The Fantasy Intellectual Teams project offers a more radical way of overcoming the corruption of the intellectual status game.

There is much to like in The Constitution of Knowledge. I especially like the focus on social epistemology–especially after my disappointing dialog with Michael Huemer on the topic.

But Rauch’s book also annoyed me a great deal. Perhaps if I am in a better mood when I write a full review, I will put a higher weight on what appealed to me and a lower weight on what annoyed me.

Reading Jonathan Rauch

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The book is called The Happiness Curve. It fits Tyler Cowen’s old definition of self-recommending, in that it is an interesting topic (the influence of stage of life on happiness) by an interesting author (Rauch). Note that Tyler himself recommends the book.

Rauch looks at the paradox that in your forties you may doing well objectively but feel unhappy. And after age 50 you tend to feel happier, even if you are not doing so well. My hypothesis is that one’s comparative references change. At age 40, it is easy to look at people of a similar age or younger who seem to be achieving more than you are. As you get older, you start to notice people your age who are physically deteriorating or whose lives are troubled in some way, and so it is easier to feel good about what you have. Rauch does not suggest a single cause, but this change in comparative references does seem to play a role.

As long-time readers know, I think that one should take a very skeptical view of happiness research. I think that some subjective measures are necessary, but I prefer measures that are more specific: how is your health? your job? etc. I think that happiness surveys are much harder to do well and can easily produce deceptive results.

I would rather read a book like this from someone who is as skeptical as I am. For example, Rauch looks at studies that instead of showing a sharp mid-life crisis show a gradual decline in life satisfaction followed by a gradual rise. But I found myself thinking: Suppose that everyone had a sharp mid-life crisis that took place at somewhat different ages, with the average age of crisis at, say, 45. If you looked at aggregate data, the crises would be smoothed away, and you would see a curve.

My personal perspective is that stage of life may have affected me a bit in the way Rauch describes. I remember in my mid-forties putting a list on the wall of my office of things I thought I should have been happy about. I called it my “serenity list.” In hindsight, had I been really serene, I would not have needed such a list. I have no need for one now. The Happiness Curve would have predicted this.

But overall, I believe that my outlook tends to fluctuate at higher frequencies. I think of myself as having a personal Minsky cycle. In the “hedge” phase, my energy level is low. I don’t have much emotion, and what little I have I distrust. I waste a lot of time. I don’t start any risky projects or come up with creative ideas. In the “speculative” phase, my energy level is high. I romanticize the world, and I listen to my emotions. I use my time fully, I am creative, and I am willing to take risks. In the “Ponzi” phase, my creativity takes a more dangerous turn. My connection to reality weakens, and some of my thoughts become very dark. On a couple of occasions I had difficulty recognizing and pulling out of this phase, and some bad experiences resulted.

It is plausible that I am bipolar, but even if that were the case I do not seek treatment. Sort of like people who don’t want to move to San Diego because they would miss the seasons.

Friends have told me that it was hard for them to know the difference between my “speculative” phase and my “Ponzi” phase. In fact, hardly anybody knows which of the three phases I am in at any one time. If you guess, you are likely to be wrong.