My Review of Peter Thiel

I write,

the business environment of biotechnology, which Thiel and I agree is a very promising field for future economic growth, may be different from that of software. In software, companies like Microsoft and Facebook grew to dominance in large part because consumers find an advantage in using the same software as other consumers — this is the network effect. This in turn creates an opportunity for venture capitalists to back the rapid expansion of a firm that is unprofitable for a few years and then wildly profitable a few years later, once the network effect has been captured. It is not necessarily the case that biotechnology will exhibit network effects in which profits are created by rapidly expanding on an early lead.

I should note that Edmund Phelps, in Mass Flourishing, argues that progress is driven not by big individual breakthroughs but instead by cumulative entrepreneurial progress.

Anti-Poverty Consensus?

I write,

There seems to me to be a close alignment of Ryan’s block-grant approach with the many instances in which the authors of the Hamilton Project volume propose flexible, low-cost, small-scale, locally administered programs, rather than large-scale, federally administered universal solutions. In addition, I was struck by the way that both Ryan and the Hamilton Project focus on rigorous evaluation of results as well as the need for further experimentation.

I do not expect to see a bipartisan reform of anti-poverty programs any time soon. If it were up to policy experts, yes. But politically, improving anti-poverty efforts takes a back seat to offering goodies to the middle class and to the clout of people with a stake in the existing programs.

Gentrification’s Flip Side

Elizabeth Kneebone writes,

The economically turbulent 2000s have redrawn America’s geography of poverty in more ways than one. After two downturns and subsequent recoveries that failed to reach down the economic ladder, the number of people living below the federal poverty line ($23,492 for a family of four in 2012) remains stubbornly stuck at record levels. Today, more of those residents live in suburbs than in big cities or rural communities, a significant shift compared to 2000, when the urban poor still outnumbered suburban residents living in poverty.

I got to this by reading an article linked to by Tyler Cowen.

You may recall the Haiku I wrote based on my road trip:

Gentrification
Bike-friendly beyond all sense
Poor people moved…to where?

Basically, I explain the phenomenon as follows.

1. Spending shifts from goods to education and health care (long-term trend. See Kling-Schulz, The New Commanding Heights)

2. Inner cities become impoverished, as manufacturing relocates and urban blight drives out the middle class.

3. The biggest urban employers become universities and hospitals. As they expand their presence in cities, they employ a lot of educated professionals. This leads to gentrification.

4. The urban poor get pushed out to the suburbs.

It seems to me that a lot of economic trends can be explained by the New Commanding Heights story.

The Case for Skepticism

About a book by sociologist Duncan Watts, I write,

Watts’ book can be regarded as an extended argument in favor of what I might term Epistemological Skepticism about Social Phenomena, or ESSP. Those of us with ESSP believe that we should be skeptical about how much we can know with certainty in the fields known as the social sciences. We may learn things that are true for a majority of cases under specific circumstances. But we are less likely to find perfectly reliable, broadly applicable laws comparable to those found by physicists.

Financial Stability, Regulation, and Country Size

Lorenzo writes,

Something that is very clear, is that “de-regulation” is a term empty of explanatory power. All successful six have liberalised financial markets–Australia and New Zealand, for example, were leaders in financial “de-regulation”. If someone starts trying to blame the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) on “de-regulation”, you can stop reading, they have nothing useful to say.

Pointer from Scott Sumner.

The deregulation story amounts to saying that we know that regulation can prevent a crisis, but a crisis occurred, therefore there must have been deregulation. In fact, the risk-based capital rules that I have suggested helped cause the crisis were at the time they were enacted viewed as regulatory tightening, to correct flaws in the regime that existed at the time of the S&L crisis. The deregulation that did take place was intended to reduce bank profits by making the industry more competitive, not to increase profits or risk-taking.

Lorenzo’s post mostly beats a drum that I have been beating, which is that government tends to get worse as scale increases. He writes,

It is generally just harder to stick it to folks (either by what you do or what you don’t do) in a way that doesn’t get noticed in smaller jurisdictions. (Unless jurisdictions are so small they fly under the media radar but are big enough to be semi-anonymous–urban local government in Oz has a bit of a problem there.)

On Housing Finance Reform

I write,

The dysfunctional and regressive nature of policy in housing reflects the political configuration in Washington. For several decades, policies combined the efforts of social engineers clumsily seeking to expand home ownership with well-heeled interest groups skillfully lobbying for profits. The social engineers put taxpayer subsidies up for grabs, and the interest groups do the grabbing.

No One Standard of Living

John Cochrane writes,

The deeper point is that things are getting cheaper and cheaper, and people — services provided with their expertise — are getting more and more expensive.

He points to an NYT chart showing plummeting prices for goods and soaring prices for education, health care, and child care.

My view is that a lot of spending on these services is discretionary (not all of it, of course). I think this makes any broad statement about “the” real wage incorrect. See my essay on that topic.

Me on Greg Clark’s Latest

I write,

his findings argue against the need to create strong incentives to succeed. If some people are genetically oriented toward success, then they do not need lower tax rates to spur them on. Such people would be expected to succeed regardless. The ideal society implicit in Clark’s view is one in which the role of government is to ameliorate, rather than attempt to fix, the unequal distribution of incomes.

The book I am reviewing is The Son also Rises, in which Clark argues that social status is highly heritable everywhere in spite of many differences in institutional rules. I spend a lot of the review talking about the statistical basis for Clark’s work.

SNEP Solution: Flexible Benefits and Extreme Catastrophic Health Insurance

The problem is high implicit marginal tax rates on many people who are eligible for benefits from means-tested government programs. I think that a generic solution might consist of flexible benefits.

One approach would be to replace all forms of means-tested assistance, including food stamps, housing subsidies, Medicaid, and the EITC, with a single cash benefit. For this purpose, we might also think of unemployment insurance as a means-tested benefit.

The classic approach is the negative income tax. What I would suggest is a modification of the negative income tax, in which recipients are instead given flexdollars. These would be like vouchers or food stamps, in that they can be used only for “merit goods:” food, health care/insurance, housing, and education/training. One way to think of this is that it takes the food stamp concept and broadens it to include the other merit goods.

Flexdollars would start at a high level for households with no income and then fade out at rate of 20 percent of the recipient’s adjusted gross income. This “fade-out” would act as a marginal tax rate on income, so we should be careful not to set the fade-out rate too high.

Suppose that a household receives $7500 in flexdollars per member. Thus, a family of four with zero income would receive $30,000 in flexdollars. A family of four with $20,000 in income would lose 20 percent of $20,000, or $4,000, to fade-out, and hence would receive only $26,000. A family of four with a $50,000 income would receive $20,000. A family of four with a $100,000 income would receive $10,000. A family of four with a $150,000 income would receive nothing.

At the end of the year, unused flexdollars could go into flexible savings accounts. Tghese could be used for medical emergencies, down payments when buying a home, or to save for retirement.

There are two ways in which this represents an improvement over the current approach. First, it ensures that implicit marginal tax rates are low for benefit recipients. As it is now, people with low incomes easily can find that if they work they lose more in benefits than they obtain in pay. I think that is very corrosive, and I would put a high priority on restoring the incentive for people to work, while still giving them the means to meet basic needs.

The second benefit is that it gives recipients more flexibility and choice. Just as food-stamp recipients can decide for themselves what groceries to buy, flexdollar users can decide for themselves how much to allocate to housing vs. food vs. training.

One problem with a negative income tax or with flexdollars is that some families are needier than others, particularly with respect to medical issues. Someone with a lot of ailments and little in the way of resources will not have enough flexdollars to pay medical bills (remember that there is no longer Medicaid in this approach).

The solution I would propose would be to have taxpayers provide extreme catastrophic health insurance that kicks in if a household’s medical expenses exceed $30,000 in a year. For every additional dollar of medical expenses over $20,000, the government would pay 90 percent. For example, a household requiring $100,000 would receive $72,000. Of course, households would be permitted to obtain private insurance to cover lower levels of spending and/or to cover the remaining 10 percent of higher levels of spending. Overall, this idea bears some resemblance to the idea of “catastrophic reinsurance” that was floated about ten years ago.

I am thinking that we would eliminate Federal support for unemployment compensation. Instead, perhaps a private-sector form of unemployment insurance might emerge, and households would be able to buy this using flexdollars. If it turns out that nobody wants to spend their flexdollars on unemployment insurance, then that might be a sign that unemployment insurance is not such a great thing.

It might be best to phase in implementation. The first phase might be to fold in the EITC, food stamps, housing vouchers, and health insurance subsidies. Those are all programs that already take the form of cash or vouchers given to households. A later phase would be to replace Medicaid and unemployment insurance with flexdollars given to households. (Of course, if states want to continue to continue Medicaid or to provide unemployment compensation, without any Federal dollars to support the, they are welcome to do so. I doubt that would happen.) Another phase would be to wind down all forms of housing assistance, mortgage subsidies, Federal aid to education, training programs, Pell grants, and student loan programs, and replace these with flexdollars.

One challenge with implementation is in deciding which goods and services are eligible for flexdollars. Just as the food stamp program has to decide which groceries are eligible, the flexdollar program has to decide what counts as eligible medical services, housing services, and education services. Yes, that opens up the floodgates for lots of rent-seeking. If that gets really out of control, then it would be better to give people a straight cash benefit.

This is just a concept I am toying with. Criticism welcome.

Note that I once wrote an essay that I called The FlexDollar Welfare State that was not about an idea of this character. Instead, the essay criticized the George W. Bush Administration’s domestic policy initiatives. Actually, the best thing about the essay is the discussion of the oxymoron of “company benefits.”

What is interesting is that workers are not naturally suspicious of companies that pay “good benefits.” Apparently, most people believe that “good benefits” reflect generosity and sharing by the company, rather than a shrewd, calculated effort to save on compensation costs. My guess is that the people who see through the scam of “good benefits” tend to gravitate toward self-employment, which allows them to take their payments in cash and buy benefits themselves.