Should the childless have less political power?

J. D. Vance said,

Why have we let the Democrat Party become controlled by people who don’t have children? And why is this just a normal fact of American life? That the leaders of our country should be people who don’t have a personal and direct stake in it via their own offspring, via their own children and grandchildren?

…The Democrats are talking about giving the vote to sixteen-year olds. But let’s do this instead: let’s give votes to all children in this country, but let’s give control over those votes to the parents of those children. When you go to the polls in this country, as a parent, you should have more power. You should have more of an ability to speak your voice in our democratic republic than people who don’t have kids. Let’s face the consequences and the reality. If you don’t have as much of an investment in the future of this country, maybe you shouldn’t get nearly the same voice.

I share Vance’s sentiments. I think that old-fashioned two-parent households with children tend to exhibit less political insanity.

But his electoral reform proposal does not strike me as well worked out. What if parents disagree on politics? Which parent gets to vote on behalf of the children? In a divorce, who gets custody of the votes? etc.

Perhaps what matters most is not political power but cultural power. In the 1950s, the cultural hegemony was with the Ozzie and Harriett families. Today, it is with LBGTQ. Have a nice day, J.D.

Jonathan Haidt on the state of things

Haidt is in a podcast with Bridget Phetasy. He says that things on Twitter are a thousand times smaller than they seem. But people don’t realize that. The whole podcast is recommended (but speed it up).

Also about minute 54, he says that young people tend to be cut off from history. They are very much into the present. I find I have the urge to give history lessons.

Around minute 60 he starts talking about stoics and how to use challenges to make yourself stronger.

Around minute 76 he goes on a rant against unions, noting that his parents were union organizers. Around minute 80 he credits taking LSD for helping to put him on the path to writing The Righteous Mind.

Personal dissatisfaction, amplified

Noah Smith reposts,

the Shouting Class is a tiny minority of society that dominates much of our political discourse, thanks in part to the bullhorn created by the technology of social media.

…the greater energy, zeal, and time commitment of the Shouting Class, combined with the bullhorn of social media, tips the balance of social media’s emotional effect dramatically toward the negative.

People who are chronically angry and bitter are unpleasant to be around. In the real world, most of us try to avoid such people. But Twitter draws such people like flies. As does combative politics.

For normal people with normal families, Twitter politics is like war. We’re not interested in it. Unfortunately, it is interested in us.

Post-liberal values

Mathis Bitton writes,

Gone is the appreciation for diversity, disagreement, and proceduralism. Enters an insatiable thirst for public morality, purpose, and collective attachment.

What a succinct summary of the contrast between the values the Jonathan Rauch wishes to keep and the values of what Wesley Yang calls the Successor Regime.

Incidentally, if you missed it, Jonathan Rauch had a good conversation with Russ Roberts.

Is it 2016?

I thought of the 2016 election as Bobo vs. anti-Bobo.
David Brooks himself writes,

over the past two decades, the rapidly growing economic, cultural, and social power of the bobos has generated a global backlash that is growing more and more vicious, deranged, and apocalyptic. And yet this backlash is not without basis. The bobos—or X people, or the creative class, or whatever you want to call them—have coalesced into an insular, intermarrying Brahmin elite that dominates culture, media, education, and tech. Worse, those of us in this class have had a hard time admitting our power, much less using it responsibly.

Pointer from Tyler Cowen.

Brooks concludes,

The bobos didn’t set out to be an elite, dominating class. We just fit ourselves into a system that rewarded a certain type of achievement, and then gave our children the resources that would allow them to prosper in that system too. But, blind to our own power, we have created enormous inequalities—financial inequalities and more painful inequalities of respect. The task before us is to dismantle the system that raised us.

The essay struck me as somewhat off base. Sometimes he describes bobos as 1960s liberals. At other times he describes them as wokists. They cannot be both simultaneously (many may have been both sequentially).

Brooks writes,

The creative class has converted cultural attainment into economic privilege and vice versa. It controls what Jonathan Rauch describes in his new book, The Constitution of Knowledge, as the epistemic regime—the massive network of academics and analysts who determine what is true. Most of all, it possesses the power of consecration; it determines what gets recognized and esteemed, and what gets disdained and dismissed. The web, of course, has democratized tastemaking, giving more people access to megaphones. But the setters of elite taste still tend to be graduates of selective universities living in creative-class enclaves. If you feel seen in society, that’s because the creative class sees you; if you feel unseen, that’s because this class does not.

But the wokists do not really believe in truth. They tell you what is ok to believe, and they do not care so much about empirical truth in the old-fashioned sense.

Two CRT links

For future reference.

First, William Galston writes,

Critical race theory is an explicitly left-wing movement inspired by the thinking of an Italian neo-Marxist, Antonio Gramsci. Against classic Marxism, for which material conditions are primary, Gramsci (1891-1937) focused on “hegemony”—the system of beliefs that “reinforces existing social arrangements and convinces the dominated classes that the existing order is inevitable,” as Ms. Crenshaw puts it.

Noteworthy because Galston is center-left. He is burning some bridges here.

Helen Pluckrose writes,

Rather than quibbling over whether what critics are criticising is really the theories that emerged in legal studies from the 1970s, let’s address the reality of what critical theories of race look like right now and how they are impacting real people of all races.

In much of the essay, Pluckrose really gets into the theoretical weeds, even though she points out that a different CRT has been popularized than what was created in academia. This reminds me of Keynesian economics in grad school, where there were all sorts of esoteric discussions of what Keynes really meant and what Keynesian economics ought to be. Meanwhile, what took hold in the press and in public policy is what I call “folk” Keynesianism, which is nothing more than “spending creates jobs, and jobs create spending.” The academic arguments matter only to the academics.

Similarly, I expect that academic discussions of critical race theory no longer affect “folk” critical race theory, or FCRT, if you will. FCRT is what K-12 teachers and journalists carry with them. I think it includes a belief in the moral inferiority of white males. It includes a belief that “privilege” is a very important concept. I think it includes some Puritan sensibilities, particularly an unforgiving stance regarding heretics. But these are tentative thoughts about FCRT. I do not feel confident that I have it pinned down yet.

Declare wokeness a religion

James M. Patterson writes,

If wokeness becomes a legally recognized religion in the United States, efforts by adherents to secure state patronage and enlist public entities in their struggle would violate constitutionally protected natural rights.

Having wokeness recognized legally as a religion would solve many problems.

If you watch John McWhorter on Firing Line, you will hear views that have influenced my own.

A surplus of affluent females?

1. Vincent Harinam writes,

There is an average yearly surplus of 2.2 million female undergrad enrolees between 2020 and 2029. Between 2030 and 2039, this number increases Morgan Stanley forecasts that 45 percent of working women between the ages of 25 and 44 will be single and childless by 2030, the largest share in history. to 2.3 million. Cumulatively, there will be a whopping 45.1 million women without an equally educated male partner between 2020 and 2039.

. . . Morgan Stanley forecasts that 45 percent of working women between the ages of 25 and 44 will be single and childless by 2030, the largest share in history.

This has many consequences. But one of them is that it bolsters the Democratic Party. The Democrats may not reap the demographic dividend long predicted based on rising numbers of minorities, but they can more reliably count on college-educated single women.

2. Or is it a surplus of bicycles relative to fish? (possibly obscure reference) From Aella, in an interview with Bari Weiss

When it comes to gender roles, the thing that men provide is typically protection, and the thing that women provide is typically reproduction. We no longer need protection, but we still need reproduction, so it’s like, ‘What do men do? Why are they valuable? Why are they even here?’ It’s kind of the ambient question in the background. . . .I feel like this is the thing that we’re going to have to figure out how to grapple with as a culture, because with any sort of advancement in a culture, we’re going to run into this problem where the role of one gender becomes unnecessary faster than the role of the other. This creates an imbalance in value. I think the imbalance in value ultimately is the thing that’s contributing to this sort of thing where women are able to rake in huge amounts of cash online while men are like sitting alone in their basements watching.

Culture changes one funeral at a time

Tanner Greer writes,

Cultures do not change when people replace old ideas with new ones; cultures change when people with new ideas replace the people with old ones.

With Wokism in ascendance among the young, it is hard to see how I am going to live to see its recession.

Or, as Greer puts it,

The millennials are a lost generation; they will persist in their errors to the end of their days. Theirs is a doomed cohort—and for most of the next two decades, this doomed cohort will be in charge.

Have a nice day.