Alex Tabarrok on how people learn

Alex Tabarrok writes,

Now let’s apply these issues to another one close to your life. Savings and retirement. Savings also follow an exponential process, albeit one neither as rapid nor as certain as those involving viruses. The same principles apply, however. But in this case instead of wanting to avoid the gains at the end you want to start saving early in order to capture the big gains in your 50s and 60s as you approach retirement. You don’t get many attempts at retirement so you need to use theory rather than experience. And because you don’t get many attempts you need to learn from other people, including other people’s mistakes, to guide your savings decisions today.

Economists usually look at saving for retirement as a decision that will be based on “rational, forward-looking behavior.” I think that Alex is much more realistic. He points out that people learn best from repeated personal experience. If you mess up the decision to save for retirement, you don’t find out the consequences until it is too late. To make good decisions, you have to learn from theory and from the experiences of others.

A related issue is deficit spending by the government. We have no personal experience of deficits leading to bad outcomes. People like me point out that in theory the government has to stop piling on debt at some point. But if people need to learn that lesson from experience, it will be too late.

Five books on the financial crisis

My list is here. For example,

Of the journalistic accounts of the crisis, my favorite is Bethany McLean and Joe Nocera, All the Devils are Here. I think that it helps to bring out two important aspects of the crisis. One aspect is the lack of awareness that many senior executives at financial firms had about the complex risks embedded in their firms’ portfolios. Another aspect is the role played by lobbying by Wall Street firms and Fannie Mae in shaping the mortgage finance system as it evolved in the decades leading up to the crisis.

Going you-know-where in a handbasket

if you ask Lyman Stone.

A country that was once typified by a sense that anyone could be or do anything is now hidebound by an increasingly heavy weight of rules and regulations. While this trend toward more regulation and greater constraints on regular life can be seen across all walks of life, this report focuses on five main areas:
• Increasing stringency of land use regulations such as zoning,
• Greater prevalence of restrictions on work such as occupational licensing,
• Unusually high incarceration rates given currently low crime rates,
• An education system that forces people to spend more years in school for a higher cost and less value, and
• Growing debt and other financial burdens among households and at all levels of government.

On the debt issue, Timothy Taylor writes,

Interest payments are already 9% of federal spending. Before just brushing past that number too quickly, it’s worth noting that net interest is 1.8% of GDP–call it about $360 billion that the government is spending because of past borrowing, and thus doesn’t have available for current spending, tax cuts, or deficit reduction. On the current path, interest spending will be 20% of all federal spending by 2049.

…This is a “current law” projection. It has become standard practice for the federal budget to play games by forecasting that certain spending programs will be cut and certain taxes will rise in the future. But when the actual date of such changes approaches, they are then pushed back a few more years. The CBO also constructs an “alternative fiscal scenario” which doesn’t assume that these spending cuts and tax increases scheduled for the future will actually happen. In that scenario, the rise in deficits, health care spending, interest payments, and debt is much larger.

Have a nice day.

Hard left economics

Jared Bernstein writes,

as economist Brad DeLong recently showed in a Vox interview. DeLong, who calls himself a “Rubin Democrat” (a reference to Clinton’s centrist treasury secretary, Bob Rubin), argues that the moment is such that “The baton rightly passes to our colleagues on our left. We are still here, but it is not our time to lead.” “DeLong believes,” according to the piece, that “the time of people like him running the Democratic Party has passed.”

In fact, there seems to be a widespread sentiment on the (formerly) center-left of saying about the hard left “If you can’t beat ’em, join ’em.”

To me, it seems that it is not just that the political discussion is moving toward the hard left. I see something similar going on among economists. Some prominent recent examples:

1. Emmanuel Saez and Gabriel Zucman.

2. Olivier Blanchard.

3. Jason Furman and Lawrence H. Summers.

What I call hard-left economics argues that high marginal tax rates on the rich have little or no adverse consequences. It argues that large government deficits have little or no adverse consequences. As a result, the bumper-sticker version of these papers would be:

Government should tax the rich more, because it can.

Government should spend more, because it can.

I can remember how economists on the left excoriated George W. Bush for squandering the budget surplus that President Clinton had started to build. That surplus was supposed to help avoid a collision of Baby Boomer retirement with fiscal capacity. DeLong once snarked that President Bush thought it was fine to run big deficits “because there are still checks in the checkbook.”

“There are still checks in the checkbook” has become the new fiscal wisdom.

The bank run of 1930?

Gary Gorton, Toomas Laarits, and Tyler Muir write,

At the start of the Great Depression there were no nationwide bank runs and banks did not avail themselves of the discount window. Yet, output dropped substantially: industrial production fell over 20%. As a consequence, 1930 is viewed as a puzzle. For example, Romer (1988) writes: ”The primary mystery surrounding the Great Depression is why output fell so drastically in late 1929 and all of 1930” (p. 5).2 And Bernanke (1983) does not include 1930 in his study of the effects of bank failures on output: ”it should be stated at the outset that my theory does not offer a complete explanation of the Great Depression (for example, nothing is said about 1929-1930)” (p. 258).

In this paper show that a large part of the output drop in 1930 can be explained by bank actions: the reduction in loans and purchase of safe assets. We argue that banks realized the severity of economic conditions and, in effect, ran on themselves.

I want to note this paper for future reference. But I’m not saying I buy it. I mean, the reason that output dropped so sharply is that the banks ran on themselves, and the reason that the banks ran on themselves is that they realized that output was dropping so sharply?

Timothy Taylor gets a story wrong

He writes,

There was a time, less than 20 years ago, when a major concern for the US government was how it would deal with the problems of paying off all government debt, which was projected to happen by about 2010. Alan Greenspan, then chairman of the Federal Reserve, made it a major point in his “Outlook for the federal budget and implications for fiscal policy” when he testified before the US Senate Budget Committee on January 25, 2001.

Tim tells the story as if this was a cognitive failure. Look at how hard it is to forecast! In hindsight, it looks like Greenspan’s crystal ball was cracked. Haha!

That is not the right story. It was a moral failure. I feel very strongly about this. Although I still consider Tim a great blogger, he muffed this one.

The context for Greenspan’s testimony was that newly elected President George W. Bush wanted to enact a big tax cut. One of the potential arguments against it was that it would cause the deficit to worsen. The responsible thing for Greenspan to do would have been to keep out of this issue, maintaining the political independence of the Fed. Instead, he waded in, with his ridiculous forecast, going so far as to say that it would cause dire problems for the Fed in the long run, because it would run out of government securities to buy. I hated that testimony from the moment it appeared. It was so craven (obviously, he was currying favor with the new President), so wrong on the economics, and so evil in its deception that I marked Greenspan as an irredeemable villain right then and there. I have not budged from that opinion.

Kling on the financial crisis of 2008

For the Concise Encylopedia of Economics. An excerpt:

There can be no single, definitive narrative of the crisis. This entry can cover only a small subset of the issues raised by the episode.

Metaphorically, we may think of the crisis as a fire. It started in the housing market, spread to the sub-prime mortgage market, then engulfed the entire mortgage securities market and, finally, swept through the inter-bank lending market and the market for asset-backed commercial paper.

It is now a decade since I wrote Not What They Had in Mind, which in my opinion still holds up.

In the encyclopedia entry, space was limited, and I had to limit my coverage. I decided that I had essentially no room to cover the many narratives of the crisis that differ from my own.

Will speed bankruptcy finally become policy?

Thomas H. Jackson writes,

a “section 1405 transfer”(as defined in our section- by- section proposal that forms an appendix to this chapter) within the first forty- eight hours of a bankruptcy case. If the court approves such a section 1405 transfer, then the covered financial corporation’s operations (and ownership of subsidiaries) shift to a new bridge company that is not in bankruptcy, in exchange for all its stock.

Pointer from John Taylor, who is optimistic about the prospects for enacting legislation along these lines.

This sounds like Garett Jones’ idea for speed bankruptcy. The point is to make it possible for financial institutions to fail quickly and gracefully, without threatening catastrophic spillovers. The idea starts with a bank that is financed in part by subordinated debt. The bankruptcy process consists of changing the debt into equity in the remainder of the firm, which is now solvent because it does not have the debt on its books.

Fragility

Andreas Kern and Cora Jungbluth write,

Driven by an almost uninterrupted property boom, household debt has exploded. China’s home ownership is now the highest in the world at 89.68 %, rising from almost zero two decades ago.

Did you know that? I sure didn’t. Anyway, the point of the article is that China’s firms, households, and government have taken on very high levels of debt. This would seem to make the Chinese economy fragile.

Fragility in my mind means something that can fail catastrophically, with spillover effects that are impossible to contain. Something that can fail gracefully is not fragile. That is why the retail sector is not as fragile as the banking sector. Closing down Sears does not create huge spillover effects.

In general, what are the sources of fragility that we might worry about? Unsustainable government debt is high on my list. I suspect also that the electric grid is fragile. Bruce Schneier has me concerned with the Internet of Things.

Are the big tech firms fragile? Can Amazon fail gracefully, of would it necessarily fail catastrophically?