Curating talent

Dwarkesh Patel writes,

if talent, not capital, is the bottleneck to growth, we should use our excess capital to empower the world’s underleveraged talent.

The question is, why aren’t more people trying to curate talent, whether for philanthropic reasons or simply for their own benefit?

But they are. Today, every business that isn’t in its death throes is trying to figure out how to acquire the best talent. But the significance of talent is easier to appreciate in the 21st century than it was previously.

In 1998, I wrote

In an agricultural economy, land is the scarce resource. In an industrial economy, capital is a scarce resource. The institutions that evolved in an industrial economy differ from those in an agricultural economy. This raises the question: what is the economic problem today, and how might institutions evolve in order to address it?

…To me, it is easier to understand the economic challenge today as one of allocating talent to solving problems. Furthermore, when we consider the nature of software as a quasi-public good, the problem is one of allocating talent to producing quasi-public goods.

Tyler’s tests for talent

Tyler Cowen writes,

Now if someone can pass the chess test, the art test, and the success test with flying colors…there are such people!

When I played tournament Othello, I might have been considered the top analyst, even though I was never the top player. But the best players in the world were Japanese, and they might not have passed Tyler’s chess test. Their “analysis” was often of the form “Ishii plays this square, but Tanida plays that square.” The idea was that you got to be good by copying great players and learning to intuitively mimic their styles. They did not employ the elaborate explanations of “why” that non-Japanese players used (“this takes away a quiet move to c3 and forces Black to be the first to break the double-wall pattern.”) The Japanese approach turns out to be good preparation for learning from computers, because the computer Othello program will not explain why it makes the move it does. The best you can hope is to learn to imitate its style.

For the art test, could I use folk dancing? I can appreciate good posture in good dancers. They carry their backs straight, their heads high and their shoulders wide. My own posture is graceless and hunched over, and when I try to copy dancers with good posture my wife cringes and tells me to stop looking like a [not nice word signifying homosexual].

As for the success test, I think that an intense desire for success can indeed be motivating, especially to continue to take big risks when another person would say “I’ll quit while I’m ahead.” I am definitely in the “quit while I’m ahead” camp.

Another FITs update

This is number 4. Robert Wright cites one of the books that influenced me most strongly. And I comment,

Halberstam’s book is probably the best treatise on organizational behavior you could ever read. Principal-agent problems are everywhere. The problem of whether you can trust an expert is a principal-agent problem, and it is central to many problems that we face today. I think of the game of acquiring status in principal-agent terms, and The Best and the Brightest presents a powerful case study of people who acquired status in the foreign policy world on the basis of connections and adherence to groupthink.

Government and organizational culture

Elizabeth Leyne and Yvette Nonte write,

For the IC [Intelligence Community] customer dataset, there was a stark dichotomy between the highest-level customers at the Cabinet level, who offered glowing praise for the IC, and customers a few echelons below, who gave the IC mixed to poor reviews.

Pointer from Larry Catá Backer.

Pleasing superiors while producing low-grade work is something that can happen in any organization. But in the private sector, this behavior will be weeded out, either by smart top executives or by the Darwinian competition of the market.

Contra Alexander

Scott Alexander writes,

In this model, we end up with Woke Capital because Apple and Amazon are run by programmers, by managers who used to be programmers, and by MBA finance people – and all of those groups are highly educated and therefore liberal.

I am pretty sure that the “woke” in Woke Capital comes mostly from the HR departments. They derive their power from their ability to protect the corporation from bad PR and lawsuits having to do with race and gender.

I have a hypothesis that education has become a political dividing line because there are now very many college graduates who have second-rate minds, what Tyler Cowen once called lumpenintellectuals. These second-raters have no natural ability to take on jobs that require a lot of cognitive skill. They have spilled over into jobs that require credentials but where they do not have to compete with people of genuine intellectual ability. These include many government positions, K-12 teaching, academic administration, and corporate HR. The lumpenintellectuals have to work hard to protect their status against both those who have fewer education credentials and those with more genuine smarts.

Woke ideology has emerged as a solution to this problem. Lumpenintellectuals can use Wokeism against both genuine intellectuals and the less educated. I think at some point the really smart people will get tired of being bossed around by the second-raters. Perhaps there will be coups at some universities, in which the real intellectuals take them back. More likely, colleges and universities are a lost cause, and true intellectuals will coalesce around alternative institutions.

Principles-based governance

Philip K. Howard writes,

Unlike rigid rules, an open framework of goals and principles leaves room for context-based judgment. This is how law aligns with prevailing norms of what is fair and reasonable. Such a system can be responsive and practical because, as was he case with Australian nursing homes, the people involved are able to use their authority to take responsibility and get things done.

In business, there was a movement in the 1990s to give front-line workers empowerment rather than a constraining set of rules. The idea was to throw out the procedures manual and instead give the worker a goal of pleasing the customer, subject to a few constraints.

I once suggested this sort of approach for regulation. I called it principles-based regulation. Instead of auditing banks against a specific set of rules, audit them against a set of principles for safety and soundness.

Howard is suggesting something like principles-based management of government policy. But there one has to be careful. Part of the idea of throwing out the procedures manual and instead giving someone discretion in how they achieve management’s objective is that the employee takes on accountability for results. Autonomy and accountability go together. That approach would be antithetical to how government works now. In general, no one has accountability. And government workers do not have much autonomy, either.

Incumbentocracy

As far as I know, the term was coined by Handle.

Incumbentocracy is a big topic, but in general, I’d say if you look at the set of names in the top echelon of a lot of different areas, the longevity and stability of those sets has tended to increase a lot.

Think of Harvard. Think of the NYT. Prestige hierarchies appear to be stable and self-perpetuating. But I wonder if we are in for some instability in the next twenty years.

Markets are less stable. These days, it seems difficult for a firm to remain on top for more than a few decades.

A recommended book

I review Andrey Mir’s PostJournalism. [link fixed]

But relatively placid stories do not motivate people to pay subscription fees. Today, people can get news for free. They can get sports scores, financial information, and entertainment without going to newspapers. Mir argues that nowadays people pay newspapers to validate their worldviews. Newspapers do this most effectively by highlighting stories about the outrageous actions of their subscribers’ political adversaries.

An excerpt cannot do justice to my review. And the review cannot do justice to the book.

Noah Smith and Marc Andreessen

I enjoyed this interview. Marc says,

Substack isn’t a new form of communication; in fact it’s the original form of Internet communication — the written essay, the IETF Request for Comments, the newsgroup posting, the group email, the blog post. But until now you could never get paid for writing online, and now all of a sudden you can. I think it’s hard to imagine how transformational this is going to be.

Substack is causing enormous amounts of new quality writing to come into existence that would never have existed otherwise — raising the level of idea formation and discourse in a world that badly needs it. So much of legacy media, due to the technological limitations of distribution technologies like newspapers and television, makes you stupid. Substack is the profit engine for the stuff that makes you smart.

We may hope.

Later, he says,

My partner Alex Rampell says that competition between an incumbent and a software-driven startup is “a race, where the startup is trying to get distribution before the incumbent gets innovation”. The incumbent starts with a giant advantage, which is the existing customer base, the existing brand. But the software startup also starts with a giant advantage, which is a culture built to create software from the start, with no need to adapt an older culture designed to bend metal, shuffle paper, or answer phones.

As time passes, I am increasingly skeptical that most incumbents can adapt. The culture shift is just too hard. Great software people tend to not want to work at an incumbent where the culture is not optimized to them, where they are not in charge.

I was surprised that Amazon was able to develop a logistics system before Wal-Mart could figure out the web. But Marc’s point is that as software becomes more important, the incumbent firms lose their advantage.

Marc is bullish on crypto, which he says provides

distributed consensus — the ability for many untrusted participants in a network to establish consistency and trust. This is something the Internet has never had, but now it does, and I think it will take 30 years to work through all of the things we can do as a result. Money is the easiest application of this idea, but think more broadly — we can now, in theory, build Internet native contracts, loans, insurance, title to real world assets, unique digital goods (known as non-fungible tokens or NFTs), online corporate structures (such as digital autonomous organizations or DAOs), and on and on.

Maybe. But I wonder: in the process of moving from existing trust mechanisms to “distributed consensus,” how many Chesterton fences have to be torn down, and how well will that go? When bad guys do their thing, what will the “distributed consensus” do about it? Of course, “it will take 30 years to work through all the things” may make allowances for such problems.

1960 vs. 2020: entrepreneurship and inequality

Paul Graham writes,

You could get rich from starting your own company in 1890 and in 2020, but in 1960 it was not really a viable option. You couldn’t break through the oligopolies to get at the markets. So the prestigious route in 1960 was not to start your own company, but to work your way up the corporate ladder at an existing one.

He concludes,

It’s easier now to start and grow a company than it has ever been. That means more people start them, that those who do get better terms from investors, and that the resulting companies become more valuable. Once you understand how these mechanisms work, and that startups were suppressed for most of the 20th century, you don’t have to resort to some vague right turn the country took under Reagan to explain why America’s Gini coefficient is increasing.

Pointer from Tyler Cowen.