My Reading Pile

I am still struggling with Kenneth Minogue’s The Servile Mind. I do not think any of the reviews that I have seen present a satisfying summary. I probably will take on the challenge myself at some point. I cannot tell whether my attachment to the three-axis model helps or hurts me in getting perspective on the book. He clearly dislikes the oppressor-oppressed axis, and he thinks that those who view society in those terms are necessarily headed in a statist direction that undermines individual moral character. He wants to champion individual moral choice over what he calls the “politico-moral world” of collectivist ideals. He sees individualism in moral choice as a unique characteristic of modernity, and he sees in the ideologies that bemoan “inequality” a pull backward toward traditionalism.

The rest of the books in my pile are review copies. Edmund Phelps’ Mass Flourishing overlaps a bit with Minogue, actually. In his concluding paragraph, Phelps writes,

a full return to high dynamism will require that those modern values prevail again over traditional ones: Nations will have to push back against the resurgence of traditional values that have been so suffocating in recent decades and revive the modern values that stirred people to go boldly forth toward lives of richness.

Phelps’ view of the past forty years is basically stagnationist.

Jay W. Richards’ Infiltrated suggests that the low-income-housing advocates (a) caused the financial crisis and (b) are still active politically. He describes Herb and Marion Sandler’s California savings bank in somewhat ambivalent terms. He writes,

some 70 percent of the company’s loans had substantial down payments, contrary to the subprime practice of offering loans with zero down.

His main indictment of the Sandlers is that they sold their bank at the peak of the bubble and then used the profits to fund left-wing political organizations. A strange book.

Derek Bok’s Higher Education in America is much more sanguine than I would be. He writes,

there is surprisingly little evidence that attending a highly selective college with impressive average SAT (ACT) scores produces exceptional improvement in the cognitive abilities of students.

A few pages later, with no sense of irony, he asserts,

The reason why so many capable students from low-income families do not apply to a selective college is that they are poorly informed.

Jean Dreze and Amartya Sen, An Uncertain Glory: India and its Contradictions. They indict India for its inequality and lack of infrastructure for its poor.

In 2011 half of all Indian households did not have access to toilets…compared with less than 10 percent of households lacking this facility in Bangladesh and only 1 percent or so in China.

I think that if we understood why this is the case, we probably would know a lot more about India than we do. Dreze and Sen make it sound like a lack of willpower on the part of the Indian elites, but my guess is that is not the whole story.

Ohanian, Taylor, and Wright, editors, Government Policies and the Delayed Economic Recovery. Proceedings of a conference dedicated to bashing Obama-era policies, except for Robert Hall, who did not get the memo.

In my reading, the primary source of the current state of the economy is simple–it’s that people aren’t buying enough stuff…The non-household part of private expenditure–that’s plant and equipment investment–seems to have actually outperformed its normal response to a collapse of consumption. The source of low output and employment in today’s economy is the huge decline in household spending.

Hasan Comert, Central Banks and Financial Markets: The Declining Power of US Monetary Policy. Based on a dissertation out of the left-wing, post-Keynesian U. Mass Amherst. I have high hopes for this book. From the introduction:

there has been a gradual decoupling between the Fed policy rate and both quantities and asset prices in financial markets. In this sense, the whole period [since the 1980s] can be seen as a period of decreasing effectiveness of central banks because their influence over financial markets has gradually decreased.

Expect to read more from me on Comert and Minogue, and possibly Phelps. Probably not the others.

The Newspaper Business

The newspaper business is going to die within the next twenty years. Newspaper publishing will continue, but only as a philanthropic venture.

That was me, writing in 2002.

“We’re in a post-profit era for newspapers,” Mutter says, noting the not-entirely-economic reasons behind recent rich guy purchases of the Globe and the San Diego Union-Tribune, not to mention the Koch brothers’ interest in the L.A. Times.

That is Lydia DiPillis, writing on August 5 of this year. She claims, however, that the Washington Post is not a charity case, even though she uses the term “money pit” to describe its current business condition.

Did You Two Visit the Same Country?

Timothy Taylor excerpts from the latest issue of the Journal of Economic Perspectives.

Steven N. Kaplan and Joshua Rauh write,

We believe that the US evidence on income and wealth shares for the top 1 percent is most consistent with a “superstar”-style explanation rooted in the importance of scale and skill-biased technological change. It is less consistent with an argument that the gains to the top 1 percent are rooted in greater managerial power or changes in social norms about what managers should earn.

Josh Bivens and Lawrence Mishel write,

the increase in the incomes and wages of the top 1 percent over the last three decades should be interpreted as driven largely by the creation and/or redistribution of economic rents, and not simply as the outcome of well-functioning competitive markets rewarding skills or productivity based on marginal differences.

As President Kennedy once asked two of his advisers on Vietnam, “You two did visit the same country, didn’t you?”

Fewer $20 Bills to Pick Up

That is how Greg Kaplan and Sam Schulhofer-Wohl explain the decline in internal migration in the United States.

the causes of decreased migration that we identify suggest that the economy may not be less flexible after all. Rather, low migration means that workers either do not need to move to obtain good jobs or have better information about their opportunities.

They suggest that returns to skill have tended to equalize across regions. I am not sure how to reconcile this with Enrico Moretti’s work.

Pointer from Timothy Taylor.

A Time to Buy Put Options?

I note this, from Tobias Adrian and Michael Fleming:

we present a table listing attributes of the fifteen largest bond market selloffs since 1961. The three selloffs highlighted in this post—1994, 2003, and 2013—are ranked fifth, ninth, and thirteenth, respectively, and are highlighted in blue. Beyond reporting figures behind the earlier discussion, the table shows the change in the ten-year, zero-coupon yield and in the spread between the ten-year and three-month yields between the start of each selloff and the maximum selloff date. Of note, the recent episode and 2003 are instances in which the yield spread moved almost as much as the ten-year yield itself (that is, the three-month yield rose little), explaining the importance of the term premium in those cases.

Pointer from Mark Thoma.

and this, from John Mauldin.

The Shiller P/E is now 24.4, about the same level as August 1929, higher than December 1972, higher than August 1987, but less extreme than the level of 43 that was reached in March 2000 (a level that has been followed by more than 13 years of market returns within a fraction of a percent of the return on Treasury bills – and even then only by revisiting significantly overvalued levels today). The Shiller P/E is presently moderately below the level of 27 at the October 2007 market peak. It’s worth noting that the 2000-2001 recession is already out of the Shiller calculation. Moreover, looking closely at the data, the implied profit margin embedded in today’s Shiller P/E is 6.3%, compared with a historical average of only about 5.3%. At normal profit margins, the current Shiller P/E would be 29.

State and Local Finances

Steven Malanga has lots of depressing news.

New York City’s average pension contributions have risen from 6.1 percent of its budget in 2005 to 11.5 percent today, according to a recent paper by Manhattan Institute scholar Daniel DiSalvo. In 2005, pension payments consumed 43 percent of income-tax revenue; in 2013, “every penny in personal income tax we collect will go to cover our pension bill,” Mayor Michael Bloomberg recently complained. America’s second-largest city, Los Angeles, has seen its pension payments rise from 3 percent of its budget to 18 percent today. Atlanta’s pension payments increased from $43 million annually in 2002 to $144 million in 2010, consuming 19 percent of its budget, before the city finally initiated pension reforms that capped costs and began reducing debt.

Read the whole thing. The way I see it, public employee unions are the 800-pound gorillas of state and local politics, at least in the blue states.

The Newest Table of Contents

American Macroeconomics, 1960-2012

1. The Major Viewpoints (see my previous post)
2. Targets, Instruments, Indicators, Patterns, and Stories (introduces key macroeconomic data and standard interpretations for 1960-2007; Benjamin Friedman meets Edward Leamer)
3. The Hicks-Friedman 70’s textbook synthesis. IS-LM and AS-AD in all their glory (but I hope to do this without diagrams).
4. Why macroeconomists would be better off as historians than as physicists. Causal density makes it unwise to try to draw firm conclusions. At a theoretical level, The textbook diagrams make it appear as if macroeconomic variables are stable and path-independent. Yet the Great Stagflation and the Financial Crisis Aftermath seem to represent “phase changes” or “regime shifts,” at least compared to prior experience and expectations, and macroeconomic variables exhibit obvious path-dependency. Turning from theory to empirics, we do not have controlled experiments available to us. Statistically, we cannot view macroeconomic data as consisting of repetitive trials coming from a common environment.
5. How I experienced the 1970s convulsion. Follow me as I enter Swarthmore college in 1971, learn 1960s Keynesian macro, and proceed to see what I have learned fall apart in just a few years.
6. The Many Descendants of Robert E. Lucas, Jr. and Stanley Fischer. How the macroeconomics profession became narrow, inbred, and retarded.
7. The Dirty Laundry Hidden in the 1970s Textbook Model. Problems include: the unspecified connection between short-term nominal interest rates and long-term real rates; the hypothesis of sticky nominal wages is asked to carry a very heavy load; money has close substitutes both as an asset and as a transaction medium; the paradoxical relationship between money demand, the price level, and inflation
8. The Financial Crisis and its Aftermath. Are any of the pre-2000 viewpoints adequate? What about the post-2000 viewpoints?

The Progressive People’s Romance

In this essay, I review a book by Internet-savvy political consultant Nicco Mele.

Mele combines a sophisticated understanding of what he calls “radical connectivity” and its applications with what strikes me as a romantic view of history and politics.

Mele is a young progressive who placed great hope in phenomena like the Obama Presidential campaign and the Arab Spring. In the essay, I try to point out how his perspective might change with more awareness of important libertarian concepts, notably public choice and spontaneous order.

For the Book

Here is a table to organize the various viewpoints (K means Keynesian, C means Classical, S means a synthesis):

Name KCS Date Bumper Sticker
Classical C 1936 Supply creates its own demand
1960’s Keynesian K 1960 Aggregated Demand determines output
1970s textbook synthesis S 1968 Aggregate Supply is short-run Keynesian, long-run Classical
General Disequilibrium K 1971 Disequilibrium spills over from one market to another
New Classical C 1972 Rational Expectations changes everything
New Keynesian S 1977 Sticky wages and prices change it back
Populist Supply-Side C 1980 Tax cuts raise revenue
Academic Supply-Side C 1982 Productivity shocks determine output
Liquidity Trap K 1998 Beware the zero bound on interest rates
Minsky Moment K 2011 Financial stability breeds instability
PSST C 2011 Structural change can be disruptive
Market Monetarism S 2013 Focus on expectations for nominal GDP

Notes: I date classical to the publication of The General Theory, because Keynes defined classical as a contrast to his views. I date 1960’s Keynesian to the Samuelson-Solow paper on the Phillips Curve. I date the 1970s textbook synthesis, which might be called the Friedman-Hicks synthesis, to the publication of Milton Friedman’s address to the American Economic Association (delivered in 1967, published in 1968). I date the general disequilibrium model to the publication of the Barro-Grossman book. I date the New Classical to Lucas’ JET paper. I date New Keynesian to the John Taylor and Stan Fischer papers. I date populist supply-side to the 1980 election campaign. I date academic supply-side (RBC) to the Kydland and Prescott 1982 paper. I date the liquidity trap to Krugman’s 1998 Brookings paper (yes, I know that Keynes was there first). I date the Minsky Moment to the 2011 edition of Kindleberger’s book (that’s also open to challenge). I date PSST to my paper in Capitalism and Society. I date Market Monetarism to Marcus Nunes’ book.

Note that the general disequilibrium, populist supply-side, and academic supply-side never really had much effect on the consensus.

One way to think of the history is that classical economics could not account for the Great Depression, and so we ended up with 1960s Keynesian as the consensus. But 1960s Keynesian could not account for the 1970s Great Stagflation, and so we ended up with the textbook synthesis as the consensus at the undergraduate level and the New Keynesian as the consensus at the graduate level. Policy thinking in Washington remained somewhere in between 1960s Keynesian and textbook synthesis, with some populist supply-side thrown in.

None of the macroeconomic viewpoints of the 1970s or 1980s could account for the aftermath of the Financial Crisis of 2008, so we had the last four emerge as contenders (I know it’s brave to put PSST in there, but it is going to be my book, after all).