7 thoughts on “Clans, Contracts, and Liberty

  1. Sounds like a worthy recommendation. Do you have any quick thoughts how a society might ‘deactivate’ the Central State along libertarian lines while avoiding the devolution into a ‘Society of Status’?

    I have not yet read ‘The Machinery of Freedom’, but it is on my to-read list…

  2. Suggested companion reading:

    NBER Working Paper #12795 (DC North et al.)
    “A Conceptual Framework for Interpreting Recorded Human History.”

    If the summary indicated in item 3 of the review is accurate, the author’s assertions are absolutely false. See, Tocqueville. Although it is likely that the United States has the only society that did not involve from the historic familial, tribal, and clans, it did develop extensive civil associations through which human relationships and interactions were (and to some extent still are) conducted externally to those human interactions which are conducted through the mechanisms of governments (Central, strong, or otherwise) at the several levels.

    Extensive efforts at “Constituency Building” which intensified in the US shortly after the middle of the 20th century have been largely self-resolving due to the extensive economic and social mobility within this society; that is, such constituencies have not resulted in the permanency of “clan” attitudes and perspectives. We no longer consider the “Irish Vote,” or “The Italian Vote.” Ultimately “The Black Vote – the Hispanic Vote” will also resolve. This society has been formed by the emancipation from clan domination the author errs if he presumes that regression.

    It is in the nature of “advanced” or “open access” societies that human interdependencies and interactions become more impersonal than the intra-personal relationships of clan (or class) dominated societies. The evolution of impersonal relationships being conducted through the mechanisms of government and the resulting increase in the functions of governments in the conduct of human relations (thus evolving Administrative States) has been observed but not adequately analyzed and appreciated in what passes for “Political Science.”

    • Thanks for the recommendation for the NBER paper on open access orders vs. limited access orders; it looks interesting and I’m reading it now. I agree that Weiner’s third claim is weak, in the sense that it’s an open question whether a weaker central government would necessarily lead (back) to clan-based governance in a society that’s already made the transition to an open access order.

      There’s a couple of other tentative conclusions I take away from (what I know so far about) Weiner’s book and the NBER paper:

      First, the experiences of stateless societies like medieval Iceland and others are arguably irrelevant with respect to the feasibility of establishing a contemporary libertarian vision of society–they’re neither existence proofs nor implementation guides. If the contemporary libertarian vision is to be instantiated it will occur in societies that have already transitioned to open access orders, all of which societies have robust central governments.

      Second, if the NBER paper is right and “sustaining fundamental changes in either the economic or political system cannot
      occur without fundamental changes in the other”, then a transition from today’s open access societies (with free markets plus strong central governments) to societies implementing the full libertarian vision (of minimal or no government) will require a simultaneous major change in the basic structure of the economy. And unless such a fundamental economic restructuring meets most people’s needs for security, sustenance, status, etc., at least as well as current open access societies, I doubt you’d see popular support for the accompanying political restructuring.

  3. “a transition from today’s open access societies (with free markets plus ** strong central governments**) to societies implementing the *full* libertarian vision (of minimal or no government) will require a simultaneous major change in the basic structure of the economy.”

    That conclusion needs more careful examination:
    Consider – Markets are “regulated” not “Free.”
    – “Strong Central Government” manages, controls, then limits “access”

    “And unless such a fundamental economic restructuring meets most people’s needs for security, sustenance, status, etc.,”

    Is that actually the “fundamental economic structure” or is that the *objective* of the political structure?

    “at least as well as current open access societies, I doubt you’d see popular support for the accompanying political restructuring.”

    Then what is causing the reductions in both access and openness to access in most “developed” Nations?

    That said, you have an interesting take on North’s work.

    • I’m counting markets as “free” compared to what came before in the limited access order; certainly they aren’t as free as they would be in the libertarian vision. On economic and political restructuring, I will hold off on further speculation until I finish reading the North paper and better understand their thesis.

  4. Finally finished reading the review, completely agree with Arnold’s conclusion, just because clans historically replaced states doesn’t mean it must always be so. It’s all about the prevailing culture, I bet Weiner would have been making the case against democracy a couple centuries back. “We all know we need a strong king to keep the clans from fighting each other” would have been his argument back then. 😉 We had a bourgeois culture that was ripe for democracy then, so the US didn’t lapse into clans once they got rid of kings.

    Not mentioned in this review is the real reason for the power of the clan, strength in numbers, but that’s not as important a force anymore. The US is less than 5% of world population, but the world trembles before its weapons, not because of the size of the US populace, but because of the technology that its open culture incents a few individuals to think up. Technology and the enlightened culture it takes to produce new ideas is now the dominant force; the clan is a vestigial institution that is irrelevant by comparison, so it’s not coming back.

    “It establishes a powerful set of internal norms, and it creates a strong sense of differentiation between the group and outsiders.”

    “societies of Status advance the principle of social justice”

    Reading these quotes, I couldn’t help but think of modern-day France, a supposed “progressive” culture, yet one that is overridden by clans, of a different sort, ie unions or other interest groups. It is interesting how the progressives think of their movement as being conceived in fighting against the original clans, the king during the French revolution, yet the clans have now taken over this movement too. Someone truly interested in the plight of the downtrodden these days would be championing free trade that brings opportunity to the poorest in Asia or Africa, yet these “progressives” only concern themselves with the comparatively rich “poor” or working-class unions in their own country.

    Of course, the clan hasn’t disappeared from any side of the debate, it just forms the backdrop for what’s called the “culture wars” these days, with the Catholics duking it out against the atheists or the NRA against the gun control mob. They may not fit the narrow definition of a “clan” but they are the same in spirit, a narrowly affiliated group that unthinkingly follows its leaders. But at least we’ve reached this level, far better for these “clans” to duke it out verbally than the mob violence of the past.

  5. I suppose I should read the book, but a few questions present themselves, at least to me:

    1. Clans obviously don’t just disappear with the emergence of a central state (at least not right away), and in any consensual form of government they will be a locus of support or opposition — e.g. the Congressional Black Caucus right on down the local CoC with three cousins on the board. How many clans can make up a society before you get negative returns on centralization? In other words: at some point the State will have to co-opt some clans against others, become its own clannish entity, or some combination thereof.

    2. What about the mediating institutions that exist alongside or even transcend clans? Churches are the most obvious and permeating institution, at least in the West. There are others as well, such as guilds, and hybrids like the Masons. Don’t they get a place on the stage in mitigating clan conflict in certain societies at least?

    3. Related to No. 2: are all clan societies and their accompanying civil societies created equal? We can speak abstractly of a central state as providing a natural sequel to clan arrangements, but in the real world modern central states are pretty new in human affairs. Some societies have healthy precursors and some don’t, and maybe we need the precursors to continue in some form in order for States to avoid totalitarianism or at least sclerosis. The balance may turn out to be a fragile one.

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