I just finished reading The Enigma of Reason by Dan Sperber and Hugo Mercier. They look at the process by which we arrive at reasons for actions. The following thought occurs to me:
You probably assume that understanding your own mind is prior to having a “theory of mind” about other humans. However, it could be the other way around.
Sperber and Mercier do not make this sort of claim. However, I do not think that it is terribly inconsistent with their views.
A theory of mind seeks to explain why agent X performs action A. What I am suggesting is that we arrive at this theory not through introspection but instead by observing action A followed by consequence B repeatedly. After we have seen this happen enough, we develop the insight that perhaps agent X is performing action A in order to achieve consequence B. Call this the basic theory of mind, or at least a theory of what motivates others. Note that we might hold such a basic theory of mind or motivation about animals or even about an inanimate object.
Given that we have a basic theory of mind and that we assume that others have similar basic theory of mind, we can engage in a new form of teaching. If I tell you that I am performing action A in order to achieve consequence B, then you can get the point of performing action A without my having to repeat action A many times.
This explanatory form of teaching is very efficient. With cultural communication so important in humans, we have become very good at explaining to others why we do things. Moreover, explanation and justification are similar functions. We develop the ability to justify to others why we do things.
We are concerned with what others think of what we say and do. As I read Sperber and Mercier, they argue that the natural function of reason is to try to gain respect and approval of others for our actions. I think that Sperber and Mercier do not give enough credit to the role of reasons in making teaching more effective. Imagine telling a child to look both ways before crossing a street without telling the child why they should do so. The child could perform the ritual exactly as directed and then walk right in front of moving car.
But the role of reasons in teaching does not address the enigma to which Sperber and Mercier refer. The enigma is that our reasoning process evolved to be biased rather than optimized to arrive at truth. Their explanation is that our reasoning process evolved as a mechanism to explain and justify our actions to others. The goal of reasoning is not to seek Truth but to defend our status. Biased reasoning is helpful for defending status. Bias is less helpful when we are trying to make decisions, but when we make decisions we are simply adapting our reasoning tool to a less natural context.
Sperber and Mercier make another claim, which is that when we argue with one another, we arrive at more reasonable conclusions than when we reason on our own. They say that this is because when we evaluate our own reasons we lack objectivity. They think we are more objective when we evaluate others’ reasons, so that our evaluations are more reliable. I do not find that persuasive. I think that part of defending our own reasons is attacking our opponents’ reasons, and I believe that we tend to be uncharitable to those who disagree with us. I am more inclined to ascribe the benefit of arguing to exposure to reasoning that we have not considered, rather than to a greater objectivity in hearing others’ points of view than in evaluating one’s own.
If reasoning evolved to justify our actions, then how do we get to a point where we use reasoning to make decisions? I think that the most consistent application of their idea would be to say that when we make decisions we anticipate having to defend our actions. As we go through this mental process, we may decide that some actions are unwise. Anticipating my wife’s reaction should I come home drunk, I stop drinking.
It could be that people with poor self-control have difficulty engaging in this exercise. That is, they either lack the ability to anticipate the reactions of others or they are less sensitive to such anticipated reactions.
It is interesting to note that I have often advised people in the throes of making a decision to imagine explaining that decision to a variety of other people. If you are thinking of quitting your job, imagine explaining that to your family, to close friends, to co-workers, and so on. I have suggested that such an exercise can help to clarify your thoughts.
Anyway, what occurs to me is that we obtain our theory of mind “outside-in” rather than “inside-out.” That is, by observing other people and listening to their reasons, we develop a theory of how our own minds ought to work.
Peter Carruthers has a paper on BBS about that “outside-in” hypothesis you might want to read – https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/behavioral-and-brain-sciences/article/how-we-know-our-own-minds-the-relationship-between-mindreading-and-metacognition/9FEA317F38503179F0B7885A6AD78D9D
Nice blog post!. I just reserved a copy of “Enigma of Reason” at my local library.
“A theory of mind seeks to explain why agent X performs action A.” False. That is a theory of behavior. A theory of mind seeks to explain consciousness; that is, the qualitative experience of the mind, as well as the nature of thought (which would include reasoning).
Haven’t people already suggested that sometimes the selfish meme can hijack the selfish gene? That sounds like a succinct description of the theory that we evolved a form of reason that tends to defend our current position rather than seek truth. (One alternative explanation is that reason that is biased in favor of the status quo is better than one that seeks out new positions, because those new positions are often costly to adopt.)
I am also put in mind of the distinction that an Evergreen State College professor made between debate and dialectic: Debate uses reason to (try to) convince other people you are right, while dialectic uses reason to (try to) find truth. I don’t know enough to assert that our ability to reason evolved for one or the other of these purposes, but we can use it for both. Dialectic use of reason is particularly common when people are not invested in a position but use reason to serve some other goal; teaching is one example of this.
As another example, in an engineering workplace, many questions come up about whether factor X or Y is more important in understanding or handling a condition. Sometimes one of the people in a discussion has a strong extrinsic reason to want the answer to be X rather than Y, but — at least in my experience — it is more common that people want to find a “more true” answer so that the resulting product is better, even if they have a strong opinion a priori on which one is more important.
Of course, the dialectic approach usually goes out the window when it comes to politics, largely because people have strong emotional investments in the policy positions they have held for a long time and because of tribal affiliations.
Are you taking “a theory of mind” to be “a theory of how our own minds ought to work,” rather than “a theory of how our own minds actually do work”?
Not just introduction to other reasoning, but other facts as well. If you prefer chocolate, it may surprise you others prefer vanilla, leading you to reassess.
Others may have stronger desires. No one should assume an equal amount of desire or difficulty for everyone.