The Illusion of Explanatory Depth

Philip M. Fernbach, Todd Rogers, Craig R. Fox and Steven A. Sloman write,

We hypothesized that people typically know less about such policies than they think they do (the illusion of explanatory depth; Rozenblit & Keil, 2002) and that polarized attitudes are enabled by simplistic causal models. We find that asking people to explain policies in detail both undermines the illusion of explanatory depth and leads to more moderate attitudes (Experiments 1 and 2). We also demonstrate that although these effects occur when people are asked to generate a mechanistic explanation, they do not occur when people are instead asked to enumerate reasons for their policy preferences (Experiment 2). Finally, we show that generating mechanistic explanations reduces donations to relevant political advocacy groups (Experiment 3). The evidence suggests that people’s mistaken sense that they understand the causal processes underlying policies contributes to polarization.

This paper was cited in a recent WSJ article by Daniel Akst, forwarded to me by a reader.

1 thought on “The Illusion of Explanatory Depth

  1. There are three areas that I would have liked to see you explore further in the ebook.

    1) Why do we have the axes that we have and why do some people adopt one axis over another? Is it nature, nature, free will or something else? Is it is more than just group identity and signalling?

    2) What areas do the axes agree on and why? Do we at least agree on the liberal project (broadly defined) of individual rights, democracy and science, but disagree on the right mix?

    3) Do people change axes or moderate their views over time? What might cause a change or moderation?

    The link above addresses 3) pretty well. Any thoughts on 1) or 2)?

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