causes for worry on this front are by no means limited to the presidential contenders. They are evident in our institutions, and not only those dominated by the Left. Indeed, the willful weakness of the Congress (which has been largely run by Republicans for two decades) and of the state governments (most of which are run by Republicans) may be the most significant problems our system confronts. Congress routinely delegates its power and abides executive overreach for policy or political ends. And while some state leaders have certainly pushed back against federal overreach at times, on the whole the states have accepted the bargain of “cooperative federalism”: From healthcare to education to transportation and beyond, federal dollars flow to the states in return for power flowing to Washington.
I am inclined to look at structural reasons for this. On states vs. the Federal government, I think that the big fact is that the Federal government can borrow to fund its operations. If we had not broken the balanced-budget norm that prevailed up until the Second World War, we might have a more balanced relationship between Washington and the states.
Congressional weakness comes from the imbalance between accountability and authority. Senators and Representatives hear from their constituents very day. They are lobbied by interest groups that hold the power of the campaign-finance purse over them. This makes our representatives in Congress feel very accountable. If they exercise authority, they fear the consequences.
For the executive branch, the situation is reversed. The agencies that issue regulations and administer programs have relatively more authority and relatively less accountability. The courts also have gained in authority with less accountability. That creates an incentive to exercise ever-increasing power.
Another factor is mass media. This concentrates the public’s attention on the President, who is much better able to gain popular support. In a mass media age, we have tended away from separation of powers and toward elected monarchy.
“In a mass media age, we have tended away from separation of powers and toward elected monarchy.” Although this phenomenon has been widely written about, imho it is most adroitly explored in FH Buckley’s excellent “The Once and Future King.” Ilya Somin’s balanced and penetrating review at: http://www.independent.org/publications/tir/article.asp?a=1056
I suspect one reason Congress is so paralyzed today is the nation really does have different constituencies. Look Steven King is exceptionally popular in the state of Iowa for his immigration views while he would be tarred & feathered in California elections. Notice Darrell Issa did not stand too closely to Trump in 2016 and barely won in a district he usually won by 20%. (I find it a little weird that Iowa would be against NAFTA trading as well.) In reality, the heavy cross Party voting in the 1950 – 1970s was our historical outlier due to the WW2 victory and Cold War threat.
Anyway with mass media of today, it is surprising the focus is on the President and the executive branch really does have the most influence on foreign policy.
And I recommend that Congress is purposely avoiding their role with foreign policy as they have not voted on Obama’s assistance on ISIS war the last two year. (Considering it is a Republican Congress they don’t want to be blamed for issues here.)
So true. Notable in how uncompetitive the parties are in different areas, there is no convergence to local means but predominately one party rule, just that the party changes with geography.
In California, I voted for HRC and then voted Republican down ballot as we really do need more Rs in Sacramento.
In California I don’t think I know anybody below 50 that voted for Trump around here. (And yes it is because of his views of Immigrants.)
Putting modesty aside, read the comments to Yuval Levin’s essay for which Arnold provides the opening link.
Then:
http://www.libertylawsite.org/2015/01/05/liberating-the-states-and-their-people-from-federal-grants-a-conversation-with-james-buckley/
The latter refers to Buckley’s short book: “Saving Congress From Itself.”
I would place this as due to the efficiency and effectiveness of the income tax for revenue, so much so that the more successful states are the ones that piggyback on it, but even there, there are limits to how how much they can diverge from one another.
A great deal of time, effort and thinking continues to go to considerations of government in a Constitutional context, on such things as the “value” of “separation of powers,” the functions of States (Federalism) and the nuances of responsibilities (obligations) that (should) accompany the public’s delegations of authorities.
Those delegations have resulted in what is the **actual** government structure – the Federal Administrative State [FAS], which displaces, and is outside, the Constitutional context, including the Federalism concept, with centralization and combinations (rather than separation) of legislative, judicial and executive functions exercised principally by the unelected.
We are probably observing the formations of coalitions amongst the three Constitutional branches, rather than the separation of their respective (designated) **powers,** for the exercise of their functions.
The goals of those managing the FAS are to operate a “government” for the attainment of many, many objectives of many, many diverse (often conflicting) interests. They require including contriving the means for those attainments (which never seem to completely come off).
There do appear to be functions for federal legislators to intermediate or interface between the FAS managers and particular interests (including constituents). Still, there is little to motivate legislators to take up responsibilities from the managers of the FAS. The executive office is now the manager of the managers of the FAS, with interface issues of its own, while holding greater centralized authority as a result.
The issues lie with the structure and operations of the FAS.
The threat is the Federal Administrative State, which differs from the constitutionally delineated “Federal Government” comprised of a “Union” of independent States.
Since its beginnings around the end of the 1800s, the FAS has become fully established through the 1900s and, by legislative delegations of authority, is now a force without limiting principles or limitations of functions.
The FAS is now a power of centralized (rule-making, execution and adjudication) authorities that are not separated by constitutional delineations, nor opposed (as yet) by any other power. It is the FAS that has direct (and ever-increasing) impacts on the populace.
The legislators have taken on a role (beneficial to them) of intermediaries between the social and economic society and the FAS, which is a creature of their delegation.
Reactions are beginning; some civil, some political.
The deficiencies of the existing (democratic) process are currently limiting the electorate (and populace) to use it for disturbance of the political order that has produced and maintains the FAS. This may well pass into civil disobedience and judicial disorder (Read, Charles Murray) if the populace impacted by the self-serving institutions of the FAS are not provided with, or cannot develop, an instrument or facilities of offsetting power.
[Originally posted 03/11/2016]
It may be that the results of recent election are evidence of an attempted disruption of the management of the FAS by the public designation of a “new type” of manager of managers.
Another factor oft mentioned in the context of why individuals will vote for state subsidies for their own particular field or hobby horse even if they understand the harm caused by such subsidies in general: the benefits of each marginal policy are concentrated while the costs are diffuse. The same is the case for states.
This is why, even if most states may prefer a broad reduction in federal intervention even at the cost of losing some federal funds, each state individually is often largely dependent on federal support for some particular industry or interest group concentrated within that state. Basically another case of the prisoner’s dilemma.