Nobel Symposium on Banking

John Cochrane writes,

I attended the Nobel Symposium on Money and Banking in May

Diamond and Rajan say that debt is necessary, because it disciplines managers. Debt holders are constantly monitoring management, and running at the first sign of trouble. In direct contrast, Gorton’s debt holders are paying no attention at all most of the time, and then dump debt out of blind fear.

One weak spot of the conference was that everyone was being too polite. Well, everyone but me. Here we have a glaring difference in views. Which is right? I asked the question.

Rajan’s response was very informative: Yes, most retail debt customers are “information insensitive,” and likely even most corporate treasuries using repo as a cash substitute. But among the New York banks who are funding each other very short term, yes indeed they are paying a lot of attention and will run when they see trouble. So the “discipline” story is narrow, for this class of lender and borrower. That seemed to me a nice reconciliation of dramatically opposing views that has troubled me for some time.

I have watched several videos from the event, including the one where the exchange between Cochrane and Rajan occurs.

Cochrane asked another question, which I don’t think anyone answered. In some sense, I think he was asking how there can be a shortage of liquid assets, given how easy it is to trade assets, including stock mutual funds. My thought is that if this phenomenon of a shortage of liquid assets is real (or was during the financial crisis of 2008), it is because of the enormous balance sheets that some of the financial institutions had assembled on very little equity, leaving them with tiny margins of error.

On the general topic of how financial intermediation operates in the economy, I keep saying that we need to appreciate the layering that takes place. Finance is a complex ecosystem, with many niches. Beware of models that simplify it. I would wager that many of the conference participants could not have been able, as of 2005, to explain the nature and significance of repo haircuts, super-senior CDO tranches, or credit default swaps on mortgage securities.

I think that Doug Diamond and Gary Gorton are a bit too much invested in the issue of runs on short-term debt. And from Cochrane’s second post on the conference, I gather that Ben Bernanke is the most invested of all.

Instead, I preferred the speakers, like Alan Taylor, who emphasized dramatic changes in asset values, rather than liquidity. Yes, a sort of run took place in 2008 in the inter-bank lending market, and that run really got the attention of Wall Street and policy makers. But the big build-up in mortgage debt and house prices, followed by a crash, was not a liquidity crisis.

Do you remember my post on the Eric Weinstein interview? One of his glib, provocative comments was

The so-called great moderation that was pushed by Alan Greenspan, Timothy Geithner, and others was in fact a kind of madness, and the 2008 crisis represented a rare break in the insanity, where the market suddenly woke up to see what was actually going on.

I would like to have seen some of the conferees respond to that remark.

3 thoughts on “Nobel Symposium on Banking

  1. I think you answer (and “correct”) Cochrane’s question. The shortage was of Liquid + Stable Value assets (i.e., not shares of S&P funds, etc.). But when the meddian candidates — the short-term liabilities in the banking sector — start being “challenged”, the process of “upgrading the portfolio” becomes a rush to US Treasuries.

    • I think “liquid”, from a trader’s perspective, means that you can trade an instrument quickly in bulk without the price dropping rapidly; rapid drops in price with volume are what “illiquidity” looks like. Illiquidity can mean that you’re trying to unload a large position; placing a large enough sell order changes the supply and lowers the price. If markets are unstable and falling, there might be illiquidity on the demand side – if there aren’t many buyers and they have different ideas about the true value of the assets, then each highest-bidder whose appetite gets sated lowers the demand and lowers the price.

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