When Will the ACA Exchanges Be Working?

Tyler Cowen writes,

The exchanges will be mostly working by March 2014, but by then the risk pool will be dysfunctional. In the meantime, real net prices will creep up, if only through implicit rationing and restrictions on provider networks. The Obama administration will attempt to address this problem — unsuccessfully — through additional regulation.

I disagree with the March 2014 date. My opinion of the distribution of likely outcomes is that it is bimodal. There is a high probability that the exchanges will be working at the end of November. I think that there is an even higher probability that they will be working never.

Why the end of November is plausible:

1. We may be hearing overly dire descriptions of the state of the system. Anyone from the outside who looks at a system will think it cannot possibly work. I once worked with a CIO who said that one of his iron laws was that anyone new on a systems project would say, “The person who originally designed this system was an idiot.”

2. Jeff Zients, the new manager, put a stake in the ground for late November. If he thinks that it is unlikely, he is, if nothing else, taking big personal risk to his own reputation.

3. CMS, the agency that was in charge, is actually a pretty effective group. They also pulled off something similar in implementing the Medicare prescription drug plan. It is plausible that they anticipated the major problems, and only minor fixes are now needed.

Why “never” is even more plausible:

1. The fundamental challenges may be very great. In the worst case, suppose that some of the legacy systems that the ACA web site has to access were built around 1975. Back then, in order to pull data out of such a system, you wrote a SAS program, put it into the queue of an IBM-370, waited for an operator to mount a data tape, and if all went well (no JCL errors, no logic errors in your SAS code), after a couple of hours you had a nice fat printout. Now, we want to be able to query those systems in real time, with perhaps hundreds of queries arriving at once…..Hmmm, maybe not even hotshot web programmers wielding the latest methodological buzzwords can pull that off so easily

2. While the Suits talk about bugs or glitches, it looks to geeks as though the problem is design flaws. Those are very hard to fix, particularly in a system that is so large already. Everything about the existing design is there for a reason. It may not be a good reason, but if you “fix it” without understanding the reason, you could be in for a nasty surprise. I just don’t see how you fix design flaws in four weeks.

3. Everyone says that there was not sufficient time to test the system before putting it into operation. Between now and the end of November, it does not seem as though there is sufficient time to test any major changes to the system. If you redesign parts of the system, then you have to write a test plan that is appropriate for the new design. Four weeks may not even be enough time to write a good test plan, much less carry it out.

4. If it is still broken at the end of November, the chances increase that starting over is the fastest path to a working system. But starting over requires a stronger political consensus in favor of the policy that the system is supposed to implement. And we do not have that.

Megan McArdle has more comments, focusing on the disconnect between thinkers and doers in the Obama Administration.

Can I Bet These Guys?

Clay Johnson and Harper Reed write,

HealthCare.gov needs to be fixed. We believe that in a few days it will be.

A few days?

They suggest that the government should modernize its procurement practices and development methods. On that issue, I do not disagree. But such modernization is not a magic bullet.

Johnson and Reed have experience in using the Internet to help political candidates mobilize supporters. To me, that is not the same thing as building a complex, mission-critical system to support a business.

What I am pushing is the idea that success in building such a system is not a matter of finding a technological magic bullet. It is a matter of starting with the right kind of organization on the business side. If the government is going to operate the world’s biggest health insurance brokerage, then the government needs to set up a business organization to manage it, with clear lines of authority and communication. Yes, it doesn’t hurt to use the most effective development tools and methods. But show me an ineffective org chart in the business, and I’ll show you a systems project failure no matter what tools and methods they use.

[UPDATE].

Jeff Sients, the new Suit, is not talking in terms of days, but he still seems optimistic.

Zients said healthcare.gov will be functioning “smoothly” for the vast majority of users by the end of November

The Suits are now talking about a “punch list,” as though this is a house that you just bought and the builder has to touch up the paint in a few places. For all I know, that accurately describes the situation. The worry is that instead of a basically solid building they have another Silver Spring Transit Center.

Ezra Klein interviews Fred Trotter, a health IT specialist who steers away from government contracts. Some excerpts:

I realized I could figure out how to develop these very complex, very new software programs or I could figure out how to contract with the government…One of the jokes we have in health IT that doctors have no idea what they want and we’ve been giving it to them for years. And I think that’s a fair assessment of technology procurement. The government has no idea what it wants and contractors have been giving it to them for years…There’s a problem in government IT departments in general where you get somebody who got a job in their 20s and didn’t really have any reason to improve their skill set or change their approach over 20 years but now they’re in charge of a department. People think if you are a geek and a technologist and that’s the way it is. But if I knew what I knew four years ago today and that’s all I knew today I’d be out of a job.

The Obamacare Suits/Geeks Divide

The New York Times reports,

One specialist said that as many as five million lines of software code may need to be rewritten before the Web site runs properly.

1. There is zero chance that rewriting five million lines of code is the answer. Either the solution is a lot simpler or there is no solution other than to start over.

My instinct from the outset was that starting over was the right answer. I am not alone.

2. The other day, President Obama said, “No one is madder about the Web site than I am, which means it’s going to get fixed.”

Or, as Michael Palin and John Cleese would put it, Wake up, Polly!

3. In response to the WaPo story, I wrote a letter to the editor, which they published (mine is the third letter on this page). This is not a technical screw-up, and it will not be fixed by technical people. It is an organizational screw-up. And until that is recognized, it probably will get worse. I write,

In my experience, communication failures between technical staff and management reflect an atmosphere of fear and lack of mutual respect.

I call this the suits-geeks divide. I saw it during the financial crisis, when it was evident that many mortgage credit-risk geeks warned of problems at their firms but management went out of the way not to listen. Merrill Lynch and Freddie Mac were particularly well-documented cases.

4. Every year, I have my high school students pair off and present proposals to start a new business. Two questions I always ask are “What are the critical management functions?” and “What would somebody experienced in this business know that you do not know?”

Suppose that President Obama and Secretary Sebelius were in the class, and they proposed starting the world’s largest health insurance brokerage. I would expect them to be able to identify as key management functions: marketing, customer education, insurance company partnership management, pricing and underwriting standards, and operations.

Somebody who had experience with creating a health insurance brokerage business would know that the systems problems are more complicated than just putting up a web site. In the background, the system needs to communicate with the systems at several government agencies and at the insurance companies. That changes it from a simple technical project to a complex, time-consuming, project involving business and technical staff.

You build a complex, mission-critical system through a process of continual negotiations among business units and technical people. You do not treat it as a procurement process. You cannot just write up a spec, put it up for bid, and parcel it out to dozens of contractors.

The development of the computer system probably would fall under operations, but you would want a project executive with a lot of authority to negotiate with all of the business units and to make project decisions. When conflicts arise, the project executive should be able to go straight to the CEO and get them resolved.

The project executive’s main focus is keeping the project’s complexity from getting out of control. The project executive must have the authority to trim features in order to meet deadlines.

You go through a lot of analysis and many painful meetings before anyone writes a line of code. The technical staff have to be able to challenge the business units, because sometimes the business unit asks for something to be done in a really complicated way, when a much simpler solution is available to solve the business problem.

One of the worst things that can happen on a systems project is to find yourself revisiting the business-technical negotiations process after writing a lot of code. If that is what is happening now, this project is in an unbelievable amount of trouble.

5. I suspect that the technical problems are mere symptoms. Probably what is fundamentally messed up in this health insurance brokerage business is the org chart.

6. In business, you need clear lines of authority and accountability. The bureaucratic tendency is to seek the opposite–to blur authority and avoid blame. This is a big challenge in the private sector. However, I think it tends to be even more difficult to overcome in government.

7. For Christmas, someone should give President Obama and Secretary Sebelius a copy of The Mythical Man-month.

[update: good PBS interview with several mythical-man-month allusions]

[update: Clay Shirky’s tweet echoes this theme.

Quality, Features, and Schedule

From the book Lost Moon, retitled Apollo 13 after the movie was made:

Apollo was downright dangerous. Earlier in the development and testing of the craft, the nozzle of the ship’s giant engine…shattered like a teacup when engineers tried to fire it. During a splashdown test, the heat shield of the craft had split open, causing the command module to sink like a $35 million anvil to the bottom of a factory test pool. The environmental control system had already logged 200 individual failures the spacecraft as a whole had accumulated roughly 20,000.

In January 1967, one of the first Apollo spacecraft caught fire during an on-the-ground test, killing astronauts Gus Grissom, Ed White, and Roger Chaffee. At that point, NASA decided that quality was more important than schedule and they overhauled the Apollo project (although they still managed a moon landing 2-1/2 years later).

In some ways, the rollout of the Obamacare web site is reminiscent of this. The hurried schedule appears to have hurt quality. The rational thing to do now would be to let the schedule slip and resolve the quality issues.

Speaking of which, here is one recent report.

Recent changes have made the exchanges easier to use, but they still require clearing the computer’s cache several times, stopping a pop-up blocker, talking to people via Web chat who suggest waiting until the server is not busy, opening links in new windows and clicking on every available possibility on a page in the hopes of not receiving an error message. With those changes, it took one hour to navigate the HealthCare.gov enrollment process Wednesday.

Those steps shouldn’t be necessary, experts said.

Neither was the last sentence.

Pinpoint the Scandal

The Sunlight Foundation reports,

All but one of of the 47 contractors who won contracts to carry out work on the Affordable Care Act worked for the government prior to its passage. Many–like the Rand Corporation and the MITRE Corporation–have done so for decades. And some, like Northrop Grumman and General Dynamics, are among the biggest wielders of influence in Washington. Some 17 ACA contract winners reported spending more than $128 million on lobbying in 2011 and 2012, while 29 had employees or political action committees or both that contributed $32 million to federal candidates and parties in the same period. Of that amount, President Barack Obama collected $3.9 million.

I don’t hold it against the contractors that they had prior government experience. I don’t hold it against them that they lobby or contribute to campaigns.

To me, the scandal is that there are 47 different organizations involved in building the site. I cannot imagine that any sane project executive would want it that way. I am just guessing, but it seems more likely to me that this many contractors were imposed on the project executive because there was a requirement to “spread the work out” to keep all these companies in the politicians’ pockets.

In any case, if you are trying to fix something that was assembled by 47 different organizations….good luck with that. Megan McArdle considers the possibility that it won’t get fixed in time.

Suits, Geeks, and Health-care Exchanges

Megan McArdle writes,

I predicted in December 2012 that the exchanges would not be up and running on time with minimal knowledge of how the contracts and budgeting were being run, because the administration was being pretty closed-mouthed about those things. Was I prophetic? Hardly. I just didn’t see how the administration could make things work in the allotted time frame. The development cycle was just too aggressive, even with what my boss used to call a “Shake and Bake” system (take something out of the box, add a few of your own ingredients and roll it out). I thought about the software-implementation projects I’d worked on (not in development but on the server side) back in the days when I was an IT consultant. This seemed a lot faster than anything that any company I’d ever worked with would commit to, even if it had already designed some of the underlying architecture.

Michael Malone writes,

Anyone who has ever worked on or, worse, bought a big software application – and this is one of the biggest in history — could have told HHS that the final result would be buggy, late, unsatisfying to users, unable to live up to its billing, and most of all, resistant to upgrades, much less wholesale changes. In the real world, you can’t just order “Make it so!”

I, too, have some experience with software development. This sounds to me like a case of suits saying one thing and geeks saying another. The suits are talking about “glitches” and “too much demand.” The geeks are making it sound like the system might be FUBAR.

1. I have been reading that the process of interacting with databases in order to deal with user identity and security issues is cumbersome, and that is causing the problems, even at small scale. If so, then this cannot be solved by adding servers or by patching a few lines of code. It may be closer to “we need to rip the guts out of the segment of the system that manages data transfer and re-architect it.”

2. My instinct at this point would be to try to separate the functions involved with sign-up from the functions involved with “tire-kicking.” I would think that it would be easier to set up a “tire-kicking” site where people can find out what the plans are and approximately what they will cost given their personal situations. However, because you could not actually sign up, the system would not store personal information or access so much data. Meanwhile, you straighten out the system that lets people actually sign up. If it takes 6 more months to build a robust sign-up system, that is a PR issue that can be managed, as long as the tire-kicking” system would enable consumers to satisfy themselves about what Obamacare means to them personally.

3. There has always been a high failure rate in big software projects. This is true in the private sector as well as in government. In this case, I think a lot depends on how easy it is to take out one part of the system and fix it without affecting other parts of the system. If the internal interdependencies are too large and complex, trying to patch the system can turn out to be a bigger challenge than starting over by creating a simpler architecture.

McKinsey Hubris

Tom Latkovic writes,

Because episodes have, by definition, a finite duration, it is now relatively easy to mine data sets to identify which providers can solve specific medical problems more effectively and at a lower cost than other providers. Whether the category being considered is surgeons who perform hip replacements, oncologists who treat prostate cancer, or hospitals that take care of stroke patients, the goal of this approach is to reward providers for delivering a patient’s desired outcome (say, walking, remission, or hospital discharge without readmission) with as few complications as possible and for providing the best experience at the lowest possible cost. Focusing on episodes of care makes it easier to compare performance across providers and encourages productive competition among them. We believe that more than $2 trillion of US annual spending on health care, which currently totals about $2.7 trillion, could be paid through an episode-focused approach.

McKinsey folks think very highly of themselves. I have always resented that.

In this case, Latkovic appears to be comparing the existing compensation system with a system that would not be gamed. That is unrealistic. Instead, ask yourself how doctors would game an outcomes-based compensation system.

1. Over-diagnose. That is, report that the patient has a condition that is worse than it is.

2. Under-treat. Suppose that 10 percent of the variation in outcomes is due to doctor actions, and 90 percent is due to other random variables. Then the profit-maximizing strategy is to pocket the payment for the “episode,” do nothing, and hope for the best. In fact, you should avoid patients where the routine action produces cure with certainty, because the profit margin is likely to be low.

3. Select only patients with high conscientiousness, because they will have much better outcomes than patients with similar ailments and low conscientiousness.

etc.

A Local Pseudo-Currency

A reader points me to this story.

What we want to do is create an appropriate scale currency for our region that will then serve the needs of our region. We used to have a system in this country of local currencies everywhere, and then there was a national currency, too. So that’s what we’d like to see again: regional currencies that work for their region and then a national currency — why not? You need that too so that you can trade across the country, or even an international currency.

I see this as analogous to frequent-flyer miles. It is a pseudo-currency that is worth something in some contexts but otherwise is not very liquid and is close to useless. As with frequent-flyer miles, the idea is to encourage customer loyalty, in this case to local merchants. I would be surprised if it turns out to be important.

The Sociology of Business

Peter Turchin writes,

Both states and corporations are, at some fundamental level, cooperative enterprises. Yes, political elites and corporate managers are motivated by personal gain, power, status, and prestige. And that even can be the majority of their motivations. But in addition there has to be something else, at least some of these elites (whether political or economic) some of the time must behave in a cooperative prosocial manner, that is, putting the common interest of their state or corporation above their private interests. When they stop doing that, states crumble and corporations go bankrupt.

Pointer from Jason Collins. I would add that as a business grows, it changes as its size exceeds the Dunbar number. Once there are more than 150 people, you have strangers dealing with one another within the business, and the dynamics change. In order to maintain prosocial behavior, you need a lot more formal rules at that point, and veterans of the smaller, informal company often cannot adjust.

Having said that, the formal rules help to make the company more robust. So I think it takes more than a few rogues to cause a breakdown in the company. It takes a more systemic cultural decline.

The Costco Business Model

Megan McArdle writes,

Costco really is a store where affluent, high-socioeconomic status households occasionally buy huge quantities of goods on the cheap: That’s Costco’s business strategy (which is why its stores are pretty much found in affluent near-in suburbs). Wal-Mart, however, is mostly a store where low-income people do their everyday shopping.

I went to Costco for the first time a couple of months ago. My first reaction was that I did not understand the business model. I thought that in the grocery business, you wanted to have lean inventories, and they seem to have the opposite. McArdle explains,

Costco has a tiny number of SKUs in a huge store — and consequently, has half as many employees per square foot of store. Their model is less labor intensive, which is to say, it has higher labor productivity. Which makes it unsurprising that they pay their employees more.

My local grocery store, Giant, is filled with employees, who are constantly restocking shelves. Giant keeps on hand relatively low inventories of a much larger number of products.

Eventually, I could imagine an equilibrium in which a store like Giant pares back on the number of items it sells in the store, keeping only the most popular items available. You would have to order less-popular items on line. That way, they could cut back on those restocking costs.

Of course, for all I know, Giant’s business model is to charge a big markup on stuff, and they figure once they get you into the store they make a profit. And if stocking a great variety of items gets you into the store, then that is the right strategy.