From 1949 authorities pursued a case against AT&T’s Bell Labs, which ultimately resulted in the forced divestiture of their non-telecoms arms, separation from their vertically integrated manufacturing, and compulsory no-fee licensing of all 7,820 of its non-telecoms patents (1.3% of the total stock of patents in force in the USA at the time). There is evidence that this move rippled across the US economy, providing a foundation for many of the great innovations of the next fifty years. But this would be true of almost any mass patent invalidation: the monopoly restrictions of patents once they are granted are the cost we pay for the investment in innovation that came before.
He raises the possibility that whatever short-run gains there were from going after AT&T, the long-run impact was to reduce R&D and growth.
In a business environment with no barriers to entry, it is impossible for a firm to capture the benefits of innovation. Hence, there is little incentive to innovate.
Patents provide one barrier to entry. But that approach has a number of flaws. I am not a fan of patents in general.
The main alternative is barriers to entry that are created by business strategy and execution. Microsoft in the 1990s was the master of using business strategy to erect barriers to entry.
These strategic barriers to entry can work both ways. To the extent that an innovation expands profit opportunities for the incumbent firm, it is encouraged. To the extent that it cannibalizes opportunities for the incumbent firm, it is stifled.
This may explain why Xerox “fumbled the future.” The personal computer and the network appeared to create the possibility of a “paperless office,” which is not a welcome development for the copy machine business.