Polling Economists on Monetary Policy Rules

The IGM forum asks economists whether or not they agree with the following:

Legislation introduced in Congress would require the Federal Reserve to “submit to the appropriate congressional committees…a Directive Policy Rule”, which shall “describe the strategy or rule of the Federal Open Market Committee for the systematic quantitative adjustment of the Policy Instrument Target to respond to a change in the Intermediate Policy Inputs.” Should the Fed deviate from the rule, the Fed Chair would have to “testify before the appropriate congressional committees as to why the [rule]…is not in compliance.” Enacting this provision would improve monetary policy outcomes in the U.S.

All economists who answered the poll said that they disagreed (a few were “uncertain”), most of them strongly. My comments:

1. The responses are mostly based on liking Bernanke and Yellen while disliking Congress. For example, Robert Shimer writes,

Under current Fed leadership, the statement is likely to be false. Under future leadership, accountability might be justifiable.

Richard Thaler (co-author of Nudge) writes,

I can’t think of any agency in government that would work better with greater supervision from Congress

2. John Taylor testified in favor of the legislation. He was not among those responding to the poll.

3. Robert Hall, saying that he disagreed, referred to an article that he wrote in 1984 which concludes,

What is important about monetary strategy is to have one. Any policy on the frontier of unemployment and price variability that is not fiercely hawkish will give better performance than we had under the meandering policy that we had over the past 30 years.

Nominal GNP targeting is one policy on the frontier…But this paper has shown that differences among sensible policies are small compared to the difference between historical policy and any sensible policy.

4. I still am somewhat unclear what Tyler Cowen means by “mood affiliation,” but this poll seems to be driven by it.