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	<title>Comments on: Joshua Gans on Apple Pay</title>
	<atom:link href="http://www.arnoldkling.com/blog/joshua-gans-on-apple-pay/feed/" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml" />
	<link>http://www.arnoldkling.com/blog/joshua-gans-on-apple-pay/</link>
	<description>taking the most charitable view of those who disagree</description>
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		<title>By: Rick Hull</title>
		<link>http://www.arnoldkling.com/blog/joshua-gans-on-apple-pay/#comment-451048</link>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Rick Hull]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 16 Sep 2014 07:16:11 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.arnoldkling.com/blog/?p=3864#comment-451048</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[In my response about plausibly defending replay attacks, above in this thread, the server knows what is sending the bitstream due to the digital signature (and timestamp).  The sender is at very least the expected keyholder.]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>In my response about plausibly defending replay attacks, above in this thread, the server knows what is sending the bitstream due to the digital signature (and timestamp).  The sender is at very least the expected keyholder.</p>
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		<title>By: George</title>
		<link>http://www.arnoldkling.com/blog/joshua-gans-on-apple-pay/#comment-450985</link>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[George]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sun, 14 Sep 2014 03:08:36 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.arnoldkling.com/blog/?p=3864#comment-450985</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[You still have the same problem....at some point a file of &quot;something&quot; is being transmitted.  You can steal images as well as data.  The server never really knows what generated the incoming bit stream....]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>You still have the same problem&#8230;.at some point a file of &#8220;something&#8221; is being transmitted.  You can steal images as well as data.  The server never really knows what generated the incoming bit stream&#8230;.</p>
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		<title>By: andrew'</title>
		<link>http://www.arnoldkling.com/blog/joshua-gans-on-apple-pay/#comment-450969</link>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[andrew']]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sat, 13 Sep 2014 07:32:28 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.arnoldkling.com/blog/?p=3864#comment-450969</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[Only your devuce needs to know you are you by knowing the exact finger print or retinal structure. Beyond that everyone else just needs to trust your device.

My problem is I can imagine a finger print  being converted to a random string and only transmitted in a form that cannot possibly be reverse engineered. I just don&#039;t trust the security people to care enough.]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Only your devuce needs to know you are you by knowing the exact finger print or retinal structure. Beyond that everyone else just needs to trust your device.</p>
<p>My problem is I can imagine a finger print  being converted to a random string and only transmitted in a form that cannot possibly be reverse engineered. I just don&#8217;t trust the security people to care enough.</p>
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	<item>
		<title>By: andrew'</title>
		<link>http://www.arnoldkling.com/blog/joshua-gans-on-apple-pay/#comment-450968</link>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[andrew']]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sat, 13 Sep 2014 07:27:54 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.arnoldkling.com/blog/?p=3864#comment-450968</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[This is more than just a problem with someone taking your words with friends box.

This could make it virtually impossible to prove you are you or to prove a criminal (or CIA or NSA rep, but I repeat myself) aren&#039;t you over any computer network.]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>This is more than just a problem with someone taking your words with friends box.</p>
<p>This could make it virtually impossible to prove you are you or to prove a criminal (or CIA or NSA rep, but I repeat myself) aren&#8217;t you over any computer network.</p>
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	<item>
		<title>By: Rick Hull</title>
		<link>http://www.arnoldkling.com/blog/joshua-gans-on-apple-pay/#comment-450951</link>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Rick Hull]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 12 Sep 2014 18:54:02 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.arnoldkling.com/blog/?p=3864#comment-450951</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[Yes, this is probably the biggest problem, which I totally forgot.]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Yes, this is probably the biggest problem, which I totally forgot.</p>
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		<title>By: Rick Hull</title>
		<link>http://www.arnoldkling.com/blog/joshua-gans-on-apple-pay/#comment-450950</link>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Rick Hull]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 12 Sep 2014 18:52:57 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.arnoldkling.com/blog/?p=3864#comment-450950</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[Good points, but it&#039;s not quite so futile, in terms of replay attacks.  The scanning device does not necessarily send &quot;some parameters&quot; like a small tuple of scalars to the authenticator.  Instead, consider what a finger scanner might send to the authenticator (digitally signed, of course):

1. An optical image / map
2. A contact map
3. A heat map
4. A conductivity map
5. Microbial activity delta (relative to before the scan)
6. Time of scan

Perhaps 1-10 MB of data in a signed, encypted transmission to the authenticator.  The first four items would be processed and evaluated, looking for natural variability yet conformance to essential matching thresholds.  The last two would be strictly for defending replay attacks.

Disclaimer: This is pure speculation on my part and not something I&#039;ve put much thought into.]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Good points, but it&#8217;s not quite so futile, in terms of replay attacks.  The scanning device does not necessarily send &#8220;some parameters&#8221; like a small tuple of scalars to the authenticator.  Instead, consider what a finger scanner might send to the authenticator (digitally signed, of course):</p>
<p>1. An optical image / map<br />
2. A contact map<br />
3. A heat map<br />
4. A conductivity map<br />
5. Microbial activity delta (relative to before the scan)<br />
6. Time of scan</p>
<p>Perhaps 1-10 MB of data in a signed, encypted transmission to the authenticator.  The first four items would be processed and evaluated, looking for natural variability yet conformance to essential matching thresholds.  The last two would be strictly for defending replay attacks.</p>
<p>Disclaimer: This is pure speculation on my part and not something I&#8217;ve put much thought into.</p>
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		<title>By: George</title>
		<link>http://www.arnoldkling.com/blog/joshua-gans-on-apple-pay/#comment-450948</link>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[George]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 12 Sep 2014 17:52:06 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.arnoldkling.com/blog/?p=3864#comment-450948</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[&quot;The Snob&quot; is right - you can&#039;t change things once the database is stolen....

In addition:  The main assumption of security is that we expect that the process starts with a finger swipe or a retinal scan.  The authentication system back on the server doesn&#039;t see this...it sees an encoded set of parameters that were calculated from the swipe/scan.  Instead of an actual swipe, a thief could send a pre-generated data file which can spoof an authentication.

Think about this: while passwords and credit card information can be stored with their MD5SUM code (you don&#039;t store the password, just a number derived from it), a retinal scan generates a slightly different set of parameters each time.  There is no encrypting algorithm that you can use to store it with....you end up with very different numbers if you start with slightly different parameters.

Security is a multi-layered complex field.  At the bottom of it all is the fact that a file has to be stored by the system to authenticate you and you can&#039;t guarantee that the file will always be safe.]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>&#8220;The Snob&#8221; is right &#8211; you can&#8217;t change things once the database is stolen&#8230;.</p>
<p>In addition:  The main assumption of security is that we expect that the process starts with a finger swipe or a retinal scan.  The authentication system back on the server doesn&#8217;t see this&#8230;it sees an encoded set of parameters that were calculated from the swipe/scan.  Instead of an actual swipe, a thief could send a pre-generated data file which can spoof an authentication.</p>
<p>Think about this: while passwords and credit card information can be stored with their MD5SUM code (you don&#8217;t store the password, just a number derived from it), a retinal scan generates a slightly different set of parameters each time.  There is no encrypting algorithm that you can use to store it with&#8230;.you end up with very different numbers if you start with slightly different parameters.</p>
<p>Security is a multi-layered complex field.  At the bottom of it all is the fact that a file has to be stored by the system to authenticate you and you can&#8217;t guarantee that the file will always be safe.</p>
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	<item>
		<title>By: The Snob</title>
		<link>http://www.arnoldkling.com/blog/joshua-gans-on-apple-pay/#comment-450947</link>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[The Snob]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 12 Sep 2014 17:40:27 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.arnoldkling.com/blog/?p=3864#comment-450947</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[The big problem with biometrics is that once the fingerprint database is stolen, which one inevitably will be, you can&#039;t change your fingerprint like you can a PIN or password.]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The big problem with biometrics is that once the fingerprint database is stolen, which one inevitably will be, you can&#8217;t change your fingerprint like you can a PIN or password.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
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	<item>
		<title>By: Rick Hull</title>
		<link>http://www.arnoldkling.com/blog/joshua-gans-on-apple-pay/#comment-450946</link>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Rick Hull]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 12 Sep 2014 17:22:58 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.arnoldkling.com/blog/?p=3864#comment-450946</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[I can&#039;t produce any support for this stance at the moment, but I distinctly recall some very convincing critiques of biometric authentication, when we first started seeing finger swipes on laptops and such, around 5 years ago.

The gist was that biometric devices are inherently susceptible to spoofing.  They make a great secondary factor in multi-factor authentication, but should not be used for single factor i.e. as the sole authenticating criterion.

Obviously technology will improve spoof resistance, but there is an arms (heh!) race to consider.  I think the main factor is that fingers and retinas and such can be scanned and sampled in ways that pass phrases and private keys cannot.]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>I can&#8217;t produce any support for this stance at the moment, but I distinctly recall some very convincing critiques of biometric authentication, when we first started seeing finger swipes on laptops and such, around 5 years ago.</p>
<p>The gist was that biometric devices are inherently susceptible to spoofing.  They make a great secondary factor in multi-factor authentication, but should not be used for single factor i.e. as the sole authenticating criterion.</p>
<p>Obviously technology will improve spoof resistance, but there is an arms (heh!) race to consider.  I think the main factor is that fingers and retinas and such can be scanned and sampled in ways that pass phrases and private keys cannot.</p>
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		<title>By: Eric Hanneken</title>
		<link>http://www.arnoldkling.com/blog/joshua-gans-on-apple-pay/#comment-450944</link>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Eric Hanneken]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 12 Sep 2014 15:31:44 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.arnoldkling.com/blog/?p=3864#comment-450944</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[Have you considered Garmin&#039;s or Magellan&#039;s navigation-capable bike computers?]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Have you considered Garmin&#8217;s or Magellan&#8217;s navigation-capable bike computers?</p>
]]></content:encoded>
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