Punishing Low-income Workers

Commenting on a new CBO report, Charles Hughes writes,

The median marginal tax rate for households just above the poverty level is almost 34 percent, the highest for any income level. Some households that receive larger benefits or higher state taxes have even higher effective rates: 10 percent of households just above the poverty line face a marginal rate higher than 65 percent. For each additional dollar earned in this range, these households would lose almost two-thirds to taxes or lost benefits. The comparable rate for the highest earners, households above 400 percent of the poverty level, is only 43.4 percent. If anything this analysis might understate how steep the effective marginal rates are for some households. CBO only considers the combined effect of income taxes, payroll taxes, SNAP and ACA exchange subsidies, so households that participate in other programs like TANF or housing assistance could face even higher rates.

I think that this ought to be a big issue. Sending a message to low-income households that says, in effect, “You might as well not work” is bound to have bad consequences. I wish that the Republicans were talking more about this and less about immigration.

Aspen Summit on Inequality and Opportunity

The video is here. Pointer from Mark Thoma.

I cannot comment on the video, since I have not watched it yet. I was just amused by the concept of a conference in Aspen on inequality. Heaven forbid that they should hold their discussion in Ferguson, Missouri, or rural Ohio.

I’ve been to Aspen only once, also for a conference. I came away thinking that the best economic opportunity there is for a gigolo. I have never seen such a concentration of wealth, attractive, unattached older women.

Panel on Inequality

With Thomas Piketty, Kevin Murphy, and Stephen Durlauf. View it at Mark Thoma’s blog.

Murphy offers the simplest explanation. Skilled workers become scarce, and less-skilled workers become abundant. The price of skilled labor rises, and those workers respond by working more. The price of less-skilled workers goes down, and they respond by working less. So income inequality shifts for both price and quantity reasons.

Why do skilled workers become scarce and less-skilled workers become abundant? I would say look at the four forces: bifurcated marriage patterns, New Commanding Heights (shift toward education and health care, aided by government subsidies), Moore’s Law, and globalization.

Is Larry Summers Getting Ready to Ditch Secular Stagnation?

He starts with the puzzle that employment and measured productivity growth have both been weak. If we are replacing less-skilled workers with machines and more-skilled workers, then why isn’t labor productivity going up?

This leads Summers to suggest that labor productivity is going up, but this is not being captured in the productivity statistics.

I am struck that there is likely what may well be an increase in unmeasured quality improvement. To take the first example that comes to mind and I’ll do an experiment with this group. I’ve done this experiment with other groups – which would you rather have for you and your family, 1980 healthcare at 1980 prices or 2015 healthcare at 2015 prices? How many people would prefer 1980 healthcare at 1980 prices? How many people would prefer 2015 healthcare at 2015 prices?

There are a fair number of abstainers but your answer was pretty clear. What does that mean? That means that healthcare inflation was negative from 1980. That is very different than the 6% or so that is reflected in the
national income accounts.

Again, thanks to Mark Thoma and Tyler Cowen for pointers.

My thoughts:

1. Since people do not face health care costs directly (with their own money), perhaps this is not a fair question.

2. What about Hansonian medicine?

3. And yet, I agree with Summers on this. I certainly would prefer today’s health care at today’s prices. One of the first points I made in Crisis of Abundance is that we could afford to give everyone in the U.S. the health care of 1970. The main reason we are spending more on health care today is that it is more capital intensive and more specialist intensive. (Incidentally, I predicted when Crisis of Abundance was published in 2006 that its relevance would last a decade. I am now confident that it will be relevant even longer.)

4. Ask Summers’ question about higher education. Would you prefer a 1980 college education at 1980 tuition or 2015 college education at 2015 tuition? Personally, I see no reason to choose the latter.

In some sense, it does not matter whether Summers’ point is valid. Productivity has been been going up quite well in manufacturing and in some other sectors (e.g., Walmart). However, labor is shifting to the New Commanding Heights sectors. Maybe productivity is rising in those sectors and inflation is over-stated, or maybe they suffer from Baumol’s cost disease and there is no overstatement of inflation. Either way, once we ditch the GDP factory and disaggregate the economy, the productivity puzzle goes away.

Summers points out that if you take the view that inflation is lower than what is measured, then real interest rates are higher than typically measured. This is not good for his previous views on secular stagnation, as he points out:

to be fair [it]has an implication for views that I and others have expressed about secular stagnation, at one level you can say, well real interest rates really aren’t that low once you subtract inflation. Once you subtract properly measured inflation, there has been less of a decline in real interest rates than we thought.

And what if we think about a disaggregated economy, with deflation in some sectors and inflation in others? Does it even make sense to talk about “the” real interest rate? Obviously for a business, it is the rate of price change in your sector that matters. For a household, you care about some average rate of price change, but which average? My girls are done with schooling, so do I care about college tuition changes? Does it matter to me whether health care inflation is overstated or not, given that my only option is to purchase health insurance at current prices?

“Secular stagnation” is anachronistic, AS-AD, GDP-factory thinking. We are in a specialized economy. Eventually, otehr economists are going to come around to PSST.

Is Larry Summers Getting Ready to Ditch AS-AD?

Both Tyler Cowen and Mark Thoma point to a discussion by Larry Summers.

I want to argue that the traditional oppositional pairing of supply side secular stagnation and demand side secular stagnation is more of a confusion, than a truth.

His current approach involves thinking about interactions between aggregate supply and aggregate demand. I hope the next stage in his thinking, and that of other macroeconomists, is to ditch AS-AD altogether. Don’t think of the economy as a GDP factory!

Instead, think in terms of a specialized economy. It is affected by secular trends, such as labor force participation increasing for women and decreasing for men from 1970-2000. It is affected by adjustment problems, such as the oil shock of the 1970s or the house-price and mortgage debt crash of 2008.

Can Crowdfunding Work?

Robert Shiller is worried about crowdfunding.

But the SEC could do more than just avow its belief in “uncensored and transparent crowd discussions.” It should require that the intermediary sponsoring a platform install a surveillance system to guard against interference and shills offering phony comments.

Pointer from Mark Thoma.

My thoughts:

Amateur investing in start-ups is per se a really bad idea. I did it a few times as an “angel investor” and got screwed. Founders made promises to me about how they would handle finances, and they quickly broke those promises. And once, when the start-up managed to do well, the founder obtained follow-up funding that amounted to legal blackmail against those of us who were early investors, so we got nothing. I came out of that experience convinced that unless you have top-notch lawyers working with you, investing in start-ups is a no-win game. As a small investor, you would need to score a home run just to cover your legal bills.

I see two possibilities for crowdfunding.

1. Suppose that people are only asked to invest in companies where they want to buy the company’s offering. Then, it seems like an interesting way for start-ups to do early market testing.

2. Suppose that the crowdfunding platforms provide some of the legal protection that venture capitalists and other high rollers are able to give themselves against subsequent misbehavior by founders or follow-on financiers.

If one of these, or preferably both, are in place, then I think that crowdfunding could last. Otherwise, I expect it to produce very negative average long-term returns and die a natural death.

Scott Sumner on the Great Depression

His book will be out soon, and no doubt it will break into my earlier list. Meanwhile, he has posted a really useful flowchart summary.

My own views.

All recession are adjustment problems. The Great Depression’s adjustment problems included:

1. Massive reconfiguration of agriculture because of tractors, trucking, and refrigeration. This displaced farm laborers.

2. Massive reconfiguration of manufacturing, as the small electric motor changed many production processes. As Amy Sue Bix points out, as of 1920 there were still men rolling cigars and making light bulbs by blowing glass. Machines could to those jobs better.

3. Sudden changes in asset prices, as a land bubble burst in the late 1920s and a stock market bubble burst in 1929.

4. The rise of fascism/socialism in Europe and a fear of something similar here–regime uncertainty, to use Robert Higgs’ term.

5. Counterproductive New Deal initiatives, such as destroying pigs and organizing industry into cartels (the NRA).

6. Loss of trust in financial intermediaries.

7. Increase in international protectionism.

Campus Hijinks

A commenter asked for my views on the latest campus protests and whatnot. My thoughts:

1. Probably over-played in the media.

2. The specific issues will turn out to be trivial. Like Hillary, I remember the 1960s. And in my high school the big victory for student activism was the agreement to designate a room where students could smoke. A smoking lounge!

3. The really radical students are a small minority. The most radical students are barely tolerated by the vast majority of students.

4. All a college administrator has to do to keep protests from getting out of hand is to communicate with reasonable students so that the radical students become isolated. I predict that where you find college administrators who “manage by walking around” and regularly talk to a lot of students, you will not find college protests that make the news.

5. The reason that campus protests do make the news is that college administrators tend to be both spineless and out of touch. They end up caving in to the radical minority, because they do not know how to obtain and use support from the reasonable majority.

5. I trace my own journey from left to right as beginning at Swarthmore College, where the radical students struck me as silly narcissists. I was not alone in having that reaction. I can think of quite a few alumni from my era who are outspoken conservatives or libertarians. The long-run impact of the protests may be to make more conservative converts than radical converts.

Robotic Hiring

It seems to outperform human hiring, at least according to Mitch Hoffman and others, who write,

We evaluate the staggered introduction of a job test across 130 locations of 15 firms employing service sector workers. We show that testing improves the match-quality of hired workers, as measured by their completed tenure, by about 14%.

Here is an abstract of a more recent version. Some questions:

1. How does this affect diversity?

2. Can testing work for high-skilled jobs, also? Software engineers? Middle managers?

3. What would Tyler Cowen say?

Useful Housing Market Charts

From the San Francisco Fed. Pointer from Mark Thoma.

II mostly wanted to keep this link for future reference. It charts some key housing market indicators before and after 2008. One bit of text:

The price-to-rent ratio (red line) reached an all-time high in early 2006, marking the apex of the housing bubble. Currently, the price-to-rent ratio is about 25% below the bubble peak.

My reading of the charts is that after the bubble burst, housing construction really fell off. The result has been an increase in rents, which in turn justifies an increase in house prices. You can argue about how much overbuilding there was prior to 2007 and how much underbuilding there has been since. I doubt that one can give a definitive answer. The problem is that I do not think that anyone can say what the “right” amount of average housing space per person is. And we are in the midst of trend increases in urban and outer suburban population, and I do not know how that affects things.